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Barbara White* 
INTRODUCTION 
The arguments collectively known as the Coase Theorem were first 
presented by R.H. Coase, an economist,l in his 1960 paper entitled The 
Problem of Social Cost.2 Based on the conclusions of that "theorem,"3 Coase 
criticizes the prevailing judicial policy of resolving legal disputes on the 
basis that businesses should "internalize" costs, that is, bear the indirect 
social costs associated with the production of goods and services.4 He argues 
the automatic application of this internalization policy often leads to 
economic inefficiency rather than to the maximization of efficiency, a goal 
which the judicial policy purports to promote. As an alternative, Coase 
claims that a different rule, one based on maximizing the total product of 
the parties to the dispute, would lead society closer to economic efficiency.s 
Over the last twenty-five years, the Coase Theorem as well as Coase's 
policy recommendation (referred to here as the total product rule) have 
fostered considerable debate both in economics and legal literature. One 
controversy focuses on whether the Coase Theorem itself is valid; some 
critics claim that Coase's arguments are analytically faulty.6 Another major 
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of Economics, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A. Mathematics, Hunter College 
(1969); Ph.D. Economics, Cornell University (1980); J.D. State University of New York at 
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1. Clifton R. Musser Professor of Economics Emeritus and Senior Fellow in Law and 
Economics, University of Chicago. 
2. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
3. Coase's conclusions are drawn from a conjecture argued by example and therefore do 
not technically constitute a theorem, i.e., an assertion formed so that it can be rigorously 
proved or disproved. This is not to say that others have not attempted a more formal treatment 
of his conjecture. See infra note 6. Although Coase never refers to a "theorem" in his article, 
the appellation given to his discussion has been used by others. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, 
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY & ApPLICATION 477-80 (4th ed. 1982) (explaining Coase's argument); 
Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other than for Profit or Sale 
Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins cases, 28 
ST LoUIS U.L.]. 647, 673-81 (1984) (Coase Theorem used to argue that tax or subsidy system 
of video cassette recorders and their home use would result in misallocation of resources). This 
Article follows the convention of calling Coase's conclusions a "theorem." 
4. Coase, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
5.Id. at 34. 
6. See, e.g., Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975); 
Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980); Kelman, Choice 
and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 769; Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A 
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981). For rigorous economic analyses questioning the validity 
of the Coase Theorem, see Aivazian & Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. & 
577 
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point of controversy is a philosophical one. Because Coase's total product 
rule often operates to redistribute wealth from the less advantaged to the 
more advantaged, other critics assert that economic analysis itself is 
inconsistent with basic principles of fairness and equity and thus offers 
nothing to judicial decisionmaking.7 
Despite these continuing disputes in the scholarly community over the 
validity and meaningfulness of Coase's approach (or perhaps because of 
these debates), the courts show a growing interest in Coase's arguments.s 
Furthermore, the judicial use of economic analysis in general is expanding, 
a trend fostered in part by law and economics programs in law schools, and 
by institutes that train judges and lawyers in the use of economic reason-
ing.9 Therefore economic analysis will likely playa growing role in legal 
decision making, and Coase will be an important influence in this develop-
ment. 
Although a plethora of articles consider the validity of Coase's theo-
rem and the philosophical relevance of economic analysis in general, 
commentators have paid little attention to evaluating the economic correct-
ness of Coase's policy recommendation. lO In other words, assuming that the 
ECC)N. 175 (1981); Bramhall & Mills, A Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees and Payments, 2 WATER 
RESOURGES RE3. 615 (1966); Kamien, Schwartz & Dolbear, Asymmetry Between Bribes and Charges, 
2 WATER RESOURCES REs. 147 (1966); Tybout, Pricing Pollution and Other Negative Externalities, 
3 BELL]. EGON. & MGMT. SCI. 252 (1972). 
7. For in;tance, Mark Kelman comments: 
The real substantive vision of the Coase Theorem, its real cultural "contribution," is 
to a partIcular world picture that seems to me both a distorted "description" and a 
horrifying covert ideal. Once we can convince ourselves that we can picture people 
evaluating end-states abstracted from their social definition and that we can aspire 
only to create social institutions that then passively respond to these mysterious 
end-state judgments, we have moved much too far in the direction of resignation, 
despairing impotence, and (dare I say it) nihilistic skepticism about our capacity to 
grow. 
Kelman, Com.nent on Hoffman and Spitzer's E.xperimental Law and Economics, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV, 1037, 1047 (1985). In a similiar vein, Lincoln Caplan reports: 
These critics say the law and economics movement ignores the complexity of human 
behavior in suggesting that society's main purpose is to maximize wealth. Even if that 
were true, say the critics, elevating this aspect of human behavior to the status of a 
legal pril1ciple promotes selfishness, not the orderly society that law seeks to 
encourage. 
Caplan, Does good economics make good UlW? [sicl, CALIF. LAw., May 1985, at 28, 30. 
8. Since Coase's article, The Problem of Soci1ll Cost, was published in 1960, there have been 
19 opinions citing the article. Seventeen of the opinions are discussed in part III of this Article. 
See infra text accompanying notes 119-269. The method used for discovering these opinions 
is discussed infra note 125. 
Casual exainination of the years in which these opinions were written reveals that the 
frequency with which courts cite to Coase is increasing with time. Two opinions cite The 
Problem of SOCi7l Cost in the first ten years after its publication (through 1970), SL,,{ opinions cite 
it in the next ten years (through 1980), and ten opinions cite it in the six years from 1980 to 
the time of this study. 
9. The University of Chicago, the University of Miami, and Emory Uniyersity are some of 
the institutions noted for providing special programs for the study oflaw and economics. The 
Federal Judicial Center also now offers judges a one-week program patterned after the ones 
offered to juriSts at the University of Miami and Emory University. 
10. See R. POSNf.R, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 35 n.l (2d ed. 1977) ("The article makes ... 
other important points, which are sometimes overlooked, relating to the case in which the costs 
of transfcrrinl~ the property rights is so high that a voluntary transfer is not feasible."). The 
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Coase Theorem is valid, it is still questionable whether the application of 
Coase's total product rule does indeed promote greater economic effi-
ciency. 
In this Article, I demonstrate that the application of the total product 
rule does not promote economic efficiency any more than the prevailing 
judicial policies that incorporate the traditional principles of fairness and 
equity.ll In fact, I show that Coase's total product rule serves primarily as 
a mechanism for redistributing wealth. I2 These efficiency and distributive 
implications also raise constitutional concerns relating to the taking of 
private property.I3 Although Coase implicitly claims that his approach does 
not contain value choices, an analysis of his methodology indicates that his 
theory does indeed mask one. I4 
Many writers suggest that economic analysis is itself so steeped in the 
values of Coase and his followers (the most notable of whom is Judge 
Richard Posner) that one cannot separate the two; thus these writers argue 
against the use of any economic reasoning in the resolution of disputes. 15 
Their perception is, however, erroneous. I6 To the contrary, I will discuss 
the way value choices can and should be separated from economic 
reasoningP Economic analysis by itself, unencumbered by value choices, 
can be an effective aid in analyzing the issues presented in legal disputes, 
clarifying when a value choice must be made, and identifying what choices 
are available. 
failure to discuss Coase's policy recommendation is often due to a failure to recognize that his 
policy is to serve when the conclusions of the theorem de not hold. Professor Farber, for 
example, appears to make this mistake when he argues that the problem with the Coase 
Theorem is that it has no real world applicability. See Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 
MINN. L. REv. 917, 918-20 (1986). His explanation, however, intuitively makes the necessary 
distinction by providing a novel insight'into "transactions costs," a concern to which Coase's 
policy recommendation is addressed. For a brief description of Farber's point and for a 
discussion of transactions costs, see infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 58-68. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 69-83. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 84-102. 
14. See infra te.xt accompanying notes 103-18. 
15. See Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 
S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 678-98 (1979). As Lincoln Caplan notes: 
Stressing the uncertainties of cost-benefit calculations, the critics contend that "law 
and economics" uses the guise of "science" to justify substituting the value judgments 
of free-market economics for those of the law. In their most critical moments, they 
accuse Posner, especially, of cloaking radical, right-wing political opinions in the 
mantle of "law and economics." 
Caplan, supra note 7, at 30. 
16. Even though this perception is erroneous, it is not without cause. See, e.g., Cohen, 
Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View from the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
1117 (1985). Cohen, a J.D. and Ph.D. (Economics) candidate at University of Pennsylvania, 
critically evaluates the first three years of Posner's tenure as judge. Cohen finds'that Posner 
not only uses economic analysis incorrectly, inappropriately, and incompletely, see id. at 
1150-66, but he finds that Posner selectively uses it primarily to support Posner's conservative 
ideology, see id. at 1151. Since Posner is the most widely known, see, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 
1986, at 1, col. 1, and probably the most widely read jurist who actively advocates the use of 
economic reasoning in resolving legal issues-his ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (3rd. ed. 
1986)(lst ed. 1973) was the first of its kind-it is not surprising that Posner's demonstration of 
the use of economic analysis in law has become synonymous with economic reasoning itself. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 119-269. 
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Indeed, case analyses of the opinions in which judges cite Coase's 
al'ticle18 demonstrate that courts intuitively recognize this separation of 
economic analysis and value choices. Even when the courts appear to think 
that their decisions are economically determined, further probing shows 
that broader social policies are involved. This observation holds true even 
for Judge Posner, who is viewed as the leading exponent of economic 
dcterminhm in legal decisionmaking. 
1. THE ROAD TO ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
A. Pigouvian Economics 
The prevailing judicial philosophy for resolving legal disputes arising 
from the infliction of harm by the production of goods and services 
requires that businesses absorb all the costs associated with production.19 
While this approach is not the sole determinant of the results in many cases, 
the courts nonetheless use it as a factor in deciding liability. This judicial 
approach found support in the economic principle of internalization 
espoused by A.C. Pigou, a leading early twentieth century economist.20 
Pigou argues that if firms did not pay for all the costs associated with 
their production, the market prices for their goods would not reflect the 
actual cost to society of the use of its resources. As a result, some goods 
would be underpriced while other goods would be overpriced. For exam-
ple, suppose that iIi the course of production a firm pollutes an adjacent 
river which has the effect of increasing the costs of production to a farmer 
downstream. If the firm is not forced to pay for those increased costs, then 
the farmer must absorb them. Due to these higher costs the farmer will 
have to charge higher prices in order to produce the same level of output 
as he did before the pollution. Because of these higher prices, however, 
consumers will purchase less of the farmer's goods than they did previously. 
A new equilibrium for the farmer can be achieved only at higher prices and 
lower levels of production. At the same time, since the firm is not required 
to absorb its pollution costs, it will have lower costs of production and thus 
will be able to charge lower prices to produce the same level of output. 
Because of these lower prices consumers are willing to purchase more of 
the firm's goods. The firm's equilibrium will consist of lower prices and 
greater omput when it does not pay for the pollution effects as compared 
with when it does.21 
Pigou characterizes this phenomenon as a distortion of the market-
place and argues that this distortion is economically inefficient. He reasons 
that the value to the consumers of the firm's additional goods is less than its 
true costs, that is, the price the consumer is willing to pay is less than the 
18. See id. 
19. This philosophy is most easily seen in the law of nuisance. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, 
PRO~SER AND KEETON ON THE Lw{ OF TORTS 629 (5th cd. 1984) ("This is simply a decision that 
the harm thus intentionally inflicted should be regarded as a cost of doing the kind of business 
in which the defendant is engaged."). 
:20. A. Pwou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932). 
21. See infra note 22 for a graphical exposition of these arguments. 
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cost of using society's resources to produce them. Similarly, the value of the 
farm output that is no longer produced exceeds the true cost savings from 
not producing it, that is, the price the consumer is willing to pay for the 
additional products is greater than the cost to society in resources to 
produce them.22 As a result, society'S total utility, that is, the measure of 
22. Pigou's arguments are captured in the graphs, displayed below, that compare the 
market equilibrium when the firm bears the pollution cost with the market equilibrium when 
the farmer bears the cost. The demand curve for each product (labeled D) reflects the quantity 
of each product consumers are willing to purchase at various prices. The supply curve reflects 
the quantity of goods each producer (the firm and the farmer) is willing to supply at various 
prices. Each supply curve is based on the costs of producing various quantities of the respective 
product. Obviously, the supply curve shifts up (i.e., the producer will demand higher prices for 
each quantity of output) if the producer bears the pollution costs on top of his other costs, and 










c, c, crops 9' 9' goods 
Farmer Firm 
FIGURE 1 
EI on the two graphs reflects the market equilibrium of the goods when the firm bears the 
costs of its pollution. In that instance, the farmer produces CI quantity of crops selling them 
at price Pel The firm produces gl quantity of goods selling them at price PgI. 
If the farmer bears the cost of the pollution, his supply curve shifts up while the firm's 
supply curve shifts down. E2 on the two graphs reflects the resulting market equilibrium in 
that instance indicating the corresponding quantity and price for each good. 
Pigou's analysis measures the welfare loss resulting from the failure to force the firm to 
internalize its pollution cost by measuring the loss in welfare in moving from EI to E2 in each 
market. A standard economics technique for measuring this loss graphically is the consumer 
surplus (or more specifically the sum of consumer plus producer surplus) approach. See H. 
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 263-68, 276-84 (2d ed. 1984). This approach measures social 
welfare by the area under the demand curve subtracting the area under the supply curve. This 
sum captures the value to the consumers of the goods (reflected in their willingness to pay for 
the goods-i.e., the area under their demand curve) minus the cost to society of producing the 
good (the area under the supply curve). Thus, the sum is a measure of the increase in 
consumer welfare as a result of producing the goods. 
Specifically for the firm-farmer example, in the farmer's market as a result of the drop in 
production from CI to C2, the utility lost is measured by trapezoid E2 EICIC2; the resource saved 
is measured by FEICIC2- The net social loss equals the difference, i.e., triangle E2FEI. In the 
firm's market, as a result of the expansion of goods from gl to g2, the utility 
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satisfaction consumers derive from goods, is reduced. Pigou argues that this 
reduction in satisfaction is economically inefficient.23 
At the heart of Pigouvian analysis is the unstated assumption that 
what com titutes the true cost of production is known. Pigou implicitly 
assumes that the costs of pollution should be borne by the firm. This 
assumption is not unreasonable given that Pigou wrote in the context of an 
emerging industrialization intruding upon agrarian interests.24 Looking 
neutrally at the firm-farmer example, however, uncovers no inherent 
reason to conclude that the firm's true cost includes the pollution effects on 
the farmer's production downstream. Certainly, if the farmer were not 
there, those costs would not exist.25 The determination of the true costs 
depends on who has the entitlement, that is, who has the right to the use of 
the river. Only when that right is assigned does the true cost become 
known. The question of the assignment of the right is a legal question, one 
which can be resolved only by weighing those factors typically considered in 
gained is trapezoid EIE2g2g1 while the increased resource use is glg2GEI' The net loss equals 
triangle GE2EI which when added to the loss in the farmer's market represents a decline in 
social welfare (and therefore is inefficient). 
This analy,is, however, has a number of problems. At a simple level, there is considerable 
double·counting. For example, the increased pollution costs resulting from the expansion of 
the firm's production from gl to g2 is measured avice, once in the additional pollution costs the 
firm does no: pay for and once in the reduction in output by the farmer from having to bear 
the pollution costs. This can be remedied easily by merely compaling the total consumer 
surplus under EI with the total consumer surplus under E2' A priori, however, one cannot tell 
without empirical data which situation, EI or E2, will result in a larger consumer surplus, 
leaving it ambiguous as to who should be a!signed pollution costs. 
More fundamentally though, even without the ambiguities, the consumer surplus approach 
har. implicit in it value assumptions about the relative worth of different human beings. In 
particular, it tends to weigh wealthier people more heavily in the measure of social welfare 
than poorer people. See H. VARIAN, supra, at 206-09. At the heart of the problems of the 
consumer sUfplus approach is the difficulty of isolating the wealth distribution implications 
from the economic efficiency analysis. This difficulty is also a major conc{!rn of this Article. 
This problem is endemic to economic analysis and has been made more obscure by much of 
the writing in the legal arena by law and economics scholars. For an economic discussion of 
these particular problems in consumer surplus analysis, see generally Willig, Consumer's Surplus 
Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 589 (1976). For recent efforts to grapple with the 
distributional implications of economic efficiency analysis, see the references cited infra notes 
69, 108 & 11 B. Of course, the reader should not infer that Pigouvian analysis in particular is 
imhued with these problems. The Coasian approach is equally steeped in this difficulty, if not 
even more sc. See infra text accompanying notes 69-83, 103-113. 
23. Economists generally agree that a lowering of society's total utility is a result of 
economic ineFficiency. For a discussion of the technical meaning of economic inefficiency, see 
infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
For a more in-depth understanding of market distortion, true cost, and total utility, see A. 
AsIHAKOPuLm, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC THEORY: MICROECONOMICS 434-36 (1978). 
24. Although policies existed that limited these liabilities, see 31 S. HALsBURY, THE L\ws OF 
ENGLAND 474-75 (Lord Simons 3d ed. 1960) (railroad liability limited by statute), the 
underlying philosophy placed responsibility on the industrial enterprise. See W. PROSSER & W. 
KEI:TON, SUpTll note 19, at 629. 
25. Of course, in reality, pollution provides a wide variety of social costs other than the 
specific harm to the farmer downstream. However, in order to facilitate the reader's 
understanding of the nuances of externalities (i.e., the noninternalized costs of production, 
such as pollution), I avoid the analytic complications introduced by multi-party victims and 
foclls solely on the case when there is, at most, one party affected by the externality. 
Therefore, I assume (as economists are wont to do) that the impact of the pollution is limited 
to one party. 
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assigning property rights. While those factors may include economic 
considerations, that is not the same as economic considerations being 
dispositive. Pigou, however, implicitly assumes, without considering possi-
ble alternatives, that the entitlement belongs to the farmer. Thus, for 
Pigou, the issue as to how to determine true costs never arises. 
B. Coase's Critique 
Coase points to this latent assumption buried in Pigou's approach.26 
He argues that Pigou made it appear as if economic reasoning dictated the 
assignment of property rights, and thus who should bear the indirect social 
costs.27 Coase argues that economic analysis does not lead inexorably to the 
choice of one assignment over the other. Coase contends that, to the 
contrary, economic analysis tells us that it is irrelevant to whom the 
property assignment is made. Ultimately no party will adjust production 
levels to accomodate obligations to bear the indirect costs. Disagreeing with 
Pigouvian analysis, Coase claims to prove that no market distortion occurs, 
with or without internalization, and therefore no economic efficiency issues 
ensue.28 
Coase argues that market distortions do not exist because all parties 
would maintain the same level of production regardless of which party is 
forced to bear the indirect costs.29 No matter who is assigned the right, the 
party without the right will pay the other party to restrain the exercise of 
that right. Furthermore, either party will pay just enough so that the output 
of goods and pollution by both parties will be the same regardless of who 
pays. For example, suppose a paper mill pollutes a river in proportion to its 
level of paper production. Suppose further that the level of crop produc-
tion of a downstream crop farmer varies with the level of pollution in the 
river. If the firm bears liability for pollution costs, the firm will offer to 
compensate the farmer for any crop damage in exchange for permission to 
pollute to some degree, so long as the necessary compensation is less than 
the value of the increased paper production to the firm. Under such 
circumstances, the farmer should agree to accept the offer since he is fully 
compensated for any crop loss. Conversely, under the same scenario, if the 
farmer must bear the pollution costs, the farmer will pay the firm to restrain 
its pollution by compensating the firm for the reduction in its output, so 
long as the necessary compensation to the firm is less than the increased 
value of the crops that results from the restrained pollution. Given that one 
or the other party (i.e., firm or farmer) must bear the costs of pollution, 
Coase argues that the output of each party will remain the same, regardless 
of who bears the costs.30 According to Coase, the optimal output for both 
26. Coase, supra note 2, at 34; see also id. at 12-15 (illustrating this assumption). 
27./d. at 13, 28-34. 
28. /d. at 1-8. 
29. [d. at 6, 8. 
30. For a numerical example that elucidates his point, see infra note 31. Probably the most 
important point that tends to escape readers and writers in the area is that the optimal output 
for each of the two parties, given the presence of a pollution problem. indeed differs from the 
optimal output for each party alone if the party did not have a pollution problem with which 
to contend. (Even Coase fails to distinguish between these differing optimal states in his 
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parties is determined by the relative market values of the parties' products. 
values not affected by the assignment of liability.3! 
numerical example to support the total product rule. See infra note 50.) This change in the 
optimal level of production that results from the introduction of pollution is not to be confused 
with Coase'~ assertions that the optimal level of production remains unchanged by liability 
as~ignment. Coase's argument is that once the parties must operate within the framework of 
pollution, e~,ch party's optimal output level in that framewrrrk is not affected by which party is 
the one leg;tlly obligated to bear the pollution costs. For a discussion of the importance of 
distinguishing between economic conditions before and after the introduction of pollution, see 
Baker, Startmg Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 939, 950-53 (1981). 
31. See Coase, supra note 2, at 6, 8. The following numerical example, a modification of 
Coase'g own, see id. at 3-6, should clarify Coase's arguments. 
Assume the farmer's acre adjacent to the river produces 20 bushels of crops when there is 
no pollution. Assume that the cost of producing those crops is $10 and that the crops sell at 
$1 per bushel. This yields the fanner a revenue of $20 and a profit of $10. 
Assume that the paper mill sells its output at $5 per pound and that its costs of production 
for different levelq of output (absent any pollution considerations) are as indicated in Table 1. 
The total profits are calculated by subtracting costs of production from revenue (pounds 
multiplied by $5). 
Table I Paper 
Pounds Revenues Costs Total Profit 
0 0 0 0 
1 $ 5 $ 1 $ 4 
2 $10 $ 3 $ 7 
3 $15 $ 6 S 9 
4 $20 $10 $10 
5 $25 S15 $10 
6 $30 $21 $ 9 
Clearly, abgcnt any pollution considerations, the ma.ximum possible profit is $10, achievable by 
producing e,ther 4 or 5 pounds of paper. For convenience, assume the firm would produce 4 
pounds. 
The impact of pollution can then be analyzed by demonstrating what happens to the 
farmer's crops when the paper mill is operating upstream. Assume that the level of crop 
damage depends on the number of pounds of paper (and therefore the quantity of pollution) 






Total Change in Bushels in Revenues 
Pounds Profit Protit Remaining (Damage) 
0 0 20 
I 4 4 19 I 
2 7 3 17 2 
3 9 2 14 3 
4 10 I 10 4 
5 10 0 5 5 
0 9 -I 0 5 
If the paper mill closed down, the farmer's acre would still produce 20 bushels of crops; if 
the mill produced 3 pounds of paper, 6 bushels of crops would be destroyed, leaving 14 
bushel> for ;ale, and if 5 pounds of paper were produced, 15 bushels would be destroyed 
leaving 5 btcshels for sale. The legal issue is who bears the pollution cost: the firm or the 
farmer? Co:tse aS5erts that from an economk perspective it does not matter because the 
parties' production decision in response to the pollution will be the same regardless of how the 
court decides. 
To unden-tand Coase's argument, first compare the two parties' output decision when the 
firm is held liable with their decision when the farmer bears the cost (i.e., the firm is found not 
liable). If the firm is liable it must compensate the farmer with $1 for every bushel lost. The 
firm examir,cs the net impact of e.xpanding its production one pound at a time. If the 
additional pound adds more in increased profit than in increased liability the firm will expand 
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Having argued that no market distortion can occur, Coase also claims 
that his analysis demonstrates that the parties themselves, through negoti-
ations, would automatically reach the economically efficient level of out-
pUt.32 By definition, society achieves economic efficiency when it reaches a 
state in which no further redistribution of resources and goods can be made 
that will make one individual better off without making another individual 
worse off.33 Since both the farmer and the firm have attained their optimal 
profit maximizing level of output, given the existence of pollution, neither 
one can improve its own situation without making the other worse off. 
Coase reasons that since the parties cannot further redistribute between 
themselves in order to make an unambiguous improvement, they therefore 
also have made an unambiguous improvement for society as a whole.34 In 
other words, Coase concludes that because the parties have satisfied the 
criterion of economic efficiency between themselves (that is, they have each 
achieved their optimal output levels given the presence of the other), they 
have, as a consequence, brought society closer to economic efficiency. 
its production. For example, the firm should increase its output at least from 0 to 1, because 
it will gain $4 in profits and pay only $1 in liability, and from 1 to 2 ($3 of added profit and 
only $2 added liability). It should not e.xpand production, however, from 2 to 3 pounds 
because there the added profits ($2) are less than the added liability ($3). Thus, the optimal 
output decision for the firm is to produce 2 pounds of paper, leaving the farmer with 17 
bushels of crops to sell. 
If the farmer must bear the cost of pollution (i.e., the firm is found not liable), then the 
farmer must consider whether it is worthwhile to pay the firm to restrain its production. If the 
farmer does not pay anything, the firm's optimal output, since it is not liable for the pollution, 
is 4 pounds for $10 profit-the output it would choose absent pollution considerations. In 
order to reduce the firm's planned output (and thereby its pollution), the 'farmer must pay the 
forgone profit from each pound of output the firm does not produce. The farmer compares 
this payment with the increased revenue he would receive from the resulting increase in the 
remaining crops. If the increased revenue from a pound reduction exceeds the payment for 
the forgone profit, the farmer will pay the firm to reduce its planned output. Thus, in the case 
here, the farmer will pay the firm to reduce its output from 4 to 3 since the farmer has to pay 
the firm $1 and the farmer's revenues increase, as a l'esuIt, by $4. Similarly, the farmer is 
willing to pay the firm the necessary $2 to reduce its output from 3 to 2, since the farmer's 
increased crops yield $3 of additional revenue. The farmer, however, will not be willing to pay 
the firm to reduce its output to 1 because the necessary payment of $3 exceeds the $2 value 
of the increased crops. Thus, the optimal decision for the farmer is to let the firm produce 2 
units of output leaving the farmer with 17 bushels to sell. This is exacdy the same outcome as 
in the scenario where the firm was held liable, which is Coase's assertion. 
32.ld. at 6. 
33. This defmition of economic efficiency is commonly referred to as satisfying the 
conditions for Pareto Optimality. Intuitively, one can understand the desirability of this 
condition by considering the implications of not satisfying it. If the condition was not satisfied, 
then the current distribution of goods and resources is such that it is possible to redistribute 
those goods so as to make at least one person better off while no one else is made any worse 
off. Clearly an improvement in the well-being of one member of society at no expense to any 
other member constitutes an unambiguous improvement in society overall. Failure to 
undertake that improvement is, by economists' standards, inefficient. When society has 
satisfied the Pareto Optimality definition of economic efficiency, all such opportunities for 
improving people's welfare have been taken advantage of, and there are no more such 
improvements that can be made. Pareto Optimality, however, does not include or address the 
issue of redistributing wealth in the favor of some to the disadvantage of others, for e.xample, 
from the rich to the poor. That is a separate issue, one that does not conflict with economic 
efficiency. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. For an expanded discussion of Pareto 
Optimality, see E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 440-44. 
34. Coase, supra note 2, at 6-8. 
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Coase's analysis leading to his conclusion-that the assignment of 
property rights is irrelevant to economic efficiency-is generally referred to 
as the Coase Theorem.s5 Based on these arguments, Coase in effect 
declares Pigouvian analysis irrelevant to achieving economic efficiency, and 
therefore not useful for the resolution oflegal disputes. Having disposed of 
Pigou's policy recommendation of internalization, Coase then turns to his 
own policy recommendation, to be used in those circumstances in which the 
court's property right assignment can be used to promote economic 
efficiency.s6 Coase's policy is referred to here as the total product rule. 
C. Coase's Total Product Rule 
Although Coase concludes that parties affected by externalities (i.e., 
indirect social costs such as pollution) produce the same levels of output 
regardless of who is required to bear those soci~ costs, he says that this 
conclusion holds true only if no impediments to the bargaining process 
exist.s7 In reality, the process of negotiation itself may bar an efficient 
outcome. Complexities, such as the gathering of complete information, the 
inclusion of all relevant parties, and the effort to ensure adherence to all 
agreed terms, are costly.S8 Labeling these complexities ma.rket transactions 
costs39 (subsequently shortened by other writers to transactions costs),40 Coase 
argues that they limit negotiations to those instances in which the increased 
value resulting from the exchanged rights exceeds the transactions costs. In 
some cases, the transactions costs may be so high that they prohibit any 
negotiations, no matter how mutually profitable the negotiations would be 
in the absence of transactions costs.41 Therefore, Coase asserts that courts, 
when ruling on entitlement disputes, must assign the property right not on 
the basis of traditional notions of property rights, but on the basis of 
maximizing total product.42 Furthermore, he argues that economists 
35. See su/lra note 3. 
36. Coase, supra note 2, at 33. 
37. rd. at 15. 
38. rd. 
39. rd. Pr,:>fessor Farber points to a potentially more fundamental barrier to negotiations: 
the lack of necessary understanding and perception on the part of the parties. See Farber, supra 
note 10, at 919. Though Professor Farber does not express it in these terms, in fact what he • 
suggests is truly an example of "transactions costs." 
40. See, e.g., Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 
11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 n.5 (1968); EIlickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among 
Ne~ghbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623, 624 (1986); Vogel, The Coase Theorem and 
California Animal Trespass Law, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 149 (1987). 
41. Coase, supra note 2, at 15. 
42. Coase states: 
In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the 
efficiency with which the economic system operates. One arrangement of rights may 
bring about a greater value of production than any other. But unless this is the 
arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs of reaching the same 
result by altering and combining rights through the market may be so great that this 
optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production which it would 
bring, may never be achieved. 
!d. at 16. 
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should advocate this approach rather than Pigou's internalization policy.43 
Coase does not provide a coherent formula or methodology that 
would allow courts to determine how property rights should be assigned to 
maximize total product.44 Instead he gives a numerical example in which a 
court, by resting its decision solely on traditional property rules, would 
drive a socially useful enterprise out of business.45 The following scenario 
best captures Coase's concern for the inefficiencies created by market 
transactions costs and the role that property right assignments can play. It 
is based on a fact pattern originally put forth by Pigou to demonstrate his 
internalization policies. Coase chooses the same fact pattern for his own 
numerical example46 and many writers have used it over the years as a 
paradigm to convey the essence of the problem of transactions costs.47 
The example, based on a nineteenth century concern, involves the 
impact of railroad expansion on farmers. The railroad operations cast off 
sparks that cause damage to crops grown on land adjacent to the tracks. If 
the railroad is held liable for the damage and no barriers inhibit negotia-
tions between it and the farmers; then the railroad could relieve itself of 
liability by compensating the farmers in advance of the growing season for 
the forgone profits associated with the expected crop damage. Each farmer 
should be willing to accept this offer since he would be in the same position 
with the railroad's payment as he would be raising the crops and selling 
them for a profit. The economic outcome will be that the railroad runs its 
trains and the farmers choose not to grow crops on the adjacent land. 
However, in the presence of transactions costs-which, in this case, arise 
from the fact that the railroad must negotiate with thousands of farmers-
the railroad cannot feasibly take advantage of negotiations in advance of 
the growing season. Thus, as the damage occurs, farmers sue the railroad, 
which must then pay for the harm. Because the railroad's liability, in this 
case, is the market value of the damaged crops (which includes not only the 
profits of the crops but also the cost of planting the crops), the liability can 
easily exceed the farmers' forgone profits the railroad would have paid had 
it been able to negotiate with each farmer individually and in advance.48 
Under extreme circumstances, the increased liability could be sufficiently 
large to drive the railroad out of business; whereas, if advance negotiations 
had been possible, the railroad operations would have been profitable.49 
43. "When an economist is comparing alternative social arrangements, the proper proce-
dure is to compare the total social product yielded by these different arrangements." Id. at 34. 
44. For a similar point, see Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). 
45. Coase, supra note 2, at 32-34. 
46.Id. 
47. See Cooter, supra note 44, at 2; Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 205 
passim (1973); Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage Antitrust 
Action, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 17,27-28 nn.58 & 60-61 (1983). 
48. Whether the advance payment of forgone profits in e.xchange for leaving the adjacent 
land untilled is less than paying for the market price of damaged crops after they have been 
grown depends on what percentage of the crop will be destroyed by the sparks. The 
assumption here is that the damage is so great that the railroad will prefer to pay in advance. 
49. Assume that the railroad performs services worth $250 per year and the cost of 
running the trains is $100 per year. Assume further that farmers collectively grow $200 worth 
of crops each year on land adjacent to the track at a cost to them of $125 per year. Finally, 
assume that the railroad causes $175 worth of damage to the crops if they are grown there. 
588 72 IOWA LAW REFlEW 577 [1987] 
Under these circumstances Coase would argue that it is imperative for the 
courts not to hold the railroad liable; for, as he says in his own example,50 
the loss of railroad service would be a tremendous loss to society. Further-
more, if the railroad were assigned the right to cast sparks, the economic 
outcome would mirror more closely what would have occurred if there had 
been no transactions costs: that is, the farmers would choose not to grow on 
acres where their crops would be damaged, and the railroad would run its 
trains.til 
The inexorable lesson appears to be that the court should ignore the 
traditional basis for resolving property disputes. The scenario calls for the 
railroad to be held free of liability and indeed, a decision the other way 
seems in retrospect to be a foolish impediment to economic prosperity. This 
example, along with others, serves to point to the need to apply the total 
product rule for property assignments. But Coase's failure to provide a 
systematic method to determine how to assign property rights so as to 
maximize total product and assure an appropriate application of his rule 
led his followers to develop criteria which the courts could use. 













If the railroad negotiates with the farmers in advance, it merely needs to pay them $75 to 
compen!,ate fc.r the forgone profits from not planting. The railroad is willing to do this because 
it earns a proft of$150 from its enterprise. After the payment of$75 to the farmers, it still has 
a remaining profit of $75 for itself. If the railroad is not able to negotiate in advance, the 
farmers grow the crops, $175 of which is damaged by the trains each year. If the railroad is 
forced to pay ,:his, the amount exceeds its profit of $150 and the railroad will choose, instead, 
to go out of busine~s. 
50. One reason, among others, that Coase's own numerical example and analysis is not 
used here h that it does not involve transactions costs. This is surprising, of course, considering 
the emphasis Coase places on market transactions costs, not only in his paper in general, see 
Coa,e, supra r.ote 2, at 15-30, but also in his discussion introducing his numerical example: 
"The problem is whether it would be desirable to make the railway liable in conditions in which 
it is too expensive for such bargains to be made," Vi. at 31. Furthermore, the other problems 
with Coa~e's analysi·. of his particular numbers are beyond the scope of this Article. For a brief 
discussion of some of these problems, see Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost in Retrospect, 2 REs. 
L. & ECON. 83, 91-93 (1980). 
The scenario presented in the text, in contrast, does capture the essence of the transactions 
co~W problem that Coase so aptly raises and discusses. It shows the economically efficient 
outcome that "{Quid occur absent transaction!. costs (the railroad purcha;es from the farmers 
the right to ca';t sparks, the farmers do not grow crops, and the trains nm) and it shows how 
the presence of transactions costs drives the railroad out of business-an inefficient and 
und.,'sirable result. It also shows how the reassignment of rights can remedy the problem. 
Implicitly, this perspective of the transactions costs problem has been adopted by subsequent 
writers addres~;ing the issue. Sec, most notably, Posner's policy recommendation to assign the 
right to the party who would have purchased it absent transactions costs, discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 52-57, and G. Calabresi's alternative, which is to assign the liability to the 
part I' who would have purchased the right, discussed Infra text accompanying notes 259-69. 
51. Sf<' Coase, supra note 2, at 33. Of course, the most salient difference under the right 
assignment is that the railroad receives the right to cast sparks without paying for them. 
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D. A Total Product Rule According to Posner 
While many writers have developed methods for applying a rule to 
maximize total product in a courtroom situation,52 the most influential 
Coase supporter in this area has been Judge Richard A. Posner.53 His 
product rule criterion states that the courts should assign property rights to 
the party who, in the absence of transactions costs, would have purchased 
the rights from the other party if the rights had been awarded to that other 
party.54 In other words, he suggests assigning the property right to the 
party who "values" it more, inferring from economic arguments that this 
party uses the right more "efficiently" or at least adds more to total 
product.55 
The railroad hypothetical can serve to illustrate Posner's arguments. 
Suppose there are no transactions costs, e.g., there is one adjacent farmer 
and that farmer owns the property right of not having sparks damage his 
crops. Assuming the railroad values the right to cast sparks more than the 
farmer values having his crops remain undamaged, it can be shown that the 
railroad will end up with the right to cast sparks regardless of whether the 
farmer or the railroad initially owns the right. If the farmer initially owns 
the right, then because the railroad values the right more, the railroad will 
be willing and able to purchase the right from the farmer by offering to pay 
for the farmer's forgone profits. If the railroad initially holds the right, the 
farmer's lesser value of the right leaves the farmer unwilling to offer a sum 
sufficiently large to induce the railroad to sell the right. Therefore, 
regardless of the initial right holder's identity, the railroad will ultimately 
own the right either through purchase or award. 
Fundamentally, the railroad obtains the right regardless of the initial 
assignment because the railroad derives more economic benefit from the 
right. The railroad derives more economic benefit because society is willing 
to pay more for the services the railroad produces with that right (i.e., train 
services) than society is willing to pay for the farmer's production with that 
right (i.e., the profits of the crops). That is proof, Posner says, that the 
railroad contributes more to total product and is therefore the more 
efficient user of the right. 56 Since the more efficient user of the right is the 
party who, absent transactions costs, would purchase it from the other party 
(if the right were initially assigned to that other party), Posner asserts that 
the party's incentive to purchase the right should be dispositive in deciding 
property disputes. 
Thus, when transactions costs bar the railroad's negotiations with 
52. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, liability Rules and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Dales, lAnd, Water, and Ownership, 1 CAN. 
J. ECON. 791 (1968); Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the lAw, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (n.s.) 255 
(1967); Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage 
Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075 (1980). 
53. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer (formerly Lee and 
Brena Freeman Professor), University of Chicago Law School. 
54. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 45 (3d ed. 1986). 
55.Id. 
56. See id. at 42-43. 
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adjacent land owners, e.g., when the sheer number of adjacent land owners 
makes it difficult for the railroad to negotiate with all of them in advance, 
the railroad and the farmers are likely to litigate the railroad's liability for 
crop damage. Posner reasons that in order to overcome any barriers created 
by the transactions costs that prevent the railroad from purchasing the 
right, the court should assign the right to the railroad directly, regardless of 
the result dictated by traditional property rules. Therefore, the railroad 
should be made free of liability for the crop damage on the basis that the 
railroad would have purchased the rights from the farmers in advance (if 
the railroad did not already own them) had there been no transaction costs 
to bar the negotiations. Since that fact proves that between the two parties 
the railroad is the more efficient user of the right, Posner argues that such 
an assignment will maximize total product.57 Posner's articulation of these 
standards for invocation and application of the total product rule provided 
needed guidelines missing in Coase's original article. 
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE TOTAL PRODUCT RULE 
A. Economic EJfzciency 
Careful scrutiny of the Coase-Posner total product rule approach 
indicates that application of the total product rule does not promote 
economic efficiency to any greater extent than do traditional property 
rules. In filct, the total product rule is just as likely as traditional property 
rules to le:;sen economic efficiency as it is to enhance it. Furthermore, the 
application of the total product rule will serve as a means of redistributing 
wealth, most frequently from the less to the more economically advantaged. 
Recall that Coase subscribes to the total product rule because he thinks 
it is necessary to promote economic efficiency by assigning property rights 
to the more efficient user and thereby increasing the total productivity of 
the two parties.58 Coase implicitly assumes that increased economic effi-
ciency between the two parties would automatically increase efficiency for 
society as a whole. The linchpin of Coase's policy is the Rncrease in the total 
product of the two parties that purportedly results from assigning the right 
to the party who will use it more efficiently. If Coase's policy recommen-
dation is correct, then every application of his total product rule should 
result in increased efficiency. In fact, however, that does not happen; 
indeed, the application of the rule can simply result in a different source of 
inefficiency. 
Without transactions costs, the two parties bargain to distribute the 
right between them in the most economically efficient manner. In other 
words, as a result of negotiations, one party will not necessarily get the 
exdusive use of the right, but may simply reduce the extent of its use, 
permitting both parties to exercise the right to some degree. In contrast, in 
a property dispute in which transactions costs bar negotiations, even 
though a court must assign the property right to one or the other party, no 
57. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 18 (lst ed. 1973); Posner, supra note 47; passim. 
58. See Coase, stlpra note 2, at 34, discussed supra text accompanying notes 37-51. 
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(or limited) negotiations can take place. The parties will thus be unable to 
negotiate to share the use of the property right and reach their optimal 
levels of output. The result is that the party getting the award will tend to 
overproduce due to unrestrained exercise of the right, while the other party 
will underproduce because of interferences with its production process. 
Transactions costs prevent the losing party from purchasing a share of the 
right or paying the winning party to cut back its use. Inefficiency results 
regardless of who receives the property right. Therefore, the court's 
efficiency concern narrows to which assignment will cause less inefficiency. 
The Coase-Posner rule suggests that the property right should be assigned 
to the party that contributes more to the total product of society.59 That 
assignment, however, will not necessarily be to the party which uses the 
right less inefficiently. 
The following example demonstrates that the total product rule will 
not necessarily improve efficiency. Suppose that one party's use of the right 
interferes minimally with the other party's operations, but the other party's 
use of the right substantially or totally interferes with the first party's 
operations. Thus, in the firm-farmer hypothetical,6o the farmer's right to 
pOllution-free water may only be a minor interference to the firm, whereas 
the firm's production may destroy most of the farmer's crops. If the firm 
contributes more to total product, the total product rule would call for the 
assignment to the firm-even though the assignment of the right would 
result in almost total destruction of the farmer's crops. This is less efficient 
than if the award of the right were made to the farmer. In the latter case the 
firm would have to keep a pollution-free river, which would affect the firm 
only slightly. The farmer could produce everything that would be profit-
able to produce and the firm could produce nearly everything, making an 
assignment to the farmer a more efficient outcome. 
Viewing the same analysis from another perspective, assume that 
when no transactions costs exist, the optimal allocation of the right occurs 
when the farmer uses ninety percent of the right and the firm uses ten 
percent. If, in the presence of transactions costs, a court assigns the right to 
the firm on the grounds that the firm contributes more to total product, 
and given that no negotiations can take place, then the firm will use one 
hundred percent of the right instead of the optimal ten percent. This 
outcome is dearly and significantly less efficient than an award made to the 
farmer that permits the farmer to use one hundred percent of the right 
instead of the optimal ninety percent.61 Thus, awarding the right to the 
59. "The law can resolve incompatible uses either by recognizing a property right in the 
party whose use is the more valuable or by imposing liability on the other party." R. POSNER, 
supra note 10, at 39. 
60. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
61. Suppose that the firm, which is the more efficient user of the right to pollute 10% of 
the river, produces $100 per week of paper with the use of that right. Assume this costs the 
farmer a decrease in crop value of $20. Furthermore, assume that if the firm pollutes the river 
unabatedly, i.e., a 100% pollution level, its total product will increase $200, but the farmer's 
crop value will decrease $300. The optimal outcome, absent transactions costs, calls for the firm 
to purchase from the farmer (if the farmer owns the right) the right to pollute at a 10% level. 
The firm is dearly willing to do so since it values the 10% right at $100, as compared with the 
farmer's value of $20. The firm is dearly the more efficient user of that much of the right and 
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party that contributes more to total product does not always lead to greater 
economic efficiency between the two parties. 
Coase's omission of specific guidelines to maximize total product is not 
the sole reason for his policy's failure to ensure improved efficiency. Similar 
problems result when using Posner's criteria for assigning the property 
right. Posner would assign the property right to the party who, absent 
transactions costs, would purchase it from the other party. The willingness 
to purchase the right, Posner argues, indicates that the party values it more 
and would thus contribute more to total product.62 As a way of illustrating 
th{' difficulties with Posner's rule, consider a situation in which the 
respective transactions costs of the two parties differ. 
Suppose, in the railroad-farmer hypothetical,63 that the farmer's 
transactions costs for initiating negotiations exceed the railroad's transac-
tions costs for initiating negotiations. If the railroad is not liable for the 
damage caused by its sparks, then, absent transactions costs, the farmers 
will collectively offer to compensate the railroad to reduce the number of 
trains run 1:0 the efficient number. Each farmer contributes a share to the 
compensation that reflects the gain to the farmer of a reduction in the 
number of trains run. In the aggregate, the collective shares sufficiently 
compensate the railroad to induce a reduction to the socially optimal 
number of trains. In reality, however, farmers operating collectively incur 
extremely high transactions costs, thereby reducing the number of farmers 
who partic<pate and reducing the amount of compensation the railroad 
receives. As a result, the railroad reduces the number of trains running by 
less than the social optimum. The greater the transactions costs of collective 
action on the part of the farmers, the less negotiation undertaken and as a 
result the more remote the actual outcome is from efficiency. 
On th(~ other hand, if the railroad is liable for the sparks damage, then, 
absent transactions costs, the railroad compensates the farmers for their 
forg'one profits and the railroad schedules the same number of trains that 
it would ,~hen it is not liable. The liability rule affects the outcome, 
however, when the impact of transactions costs are considered. In this case, 
the transactions costs to the railroad of negotiating with the farmers is 
comparativdy small (e.g., as each owner fIles a complaint, the railroad pays 
for the damage for that period and then negotiates -to pay the forgone 
profits in the future). Thus, due to its lower transactions costs, the railroad, 
by being held liable, achieves an outcome significantly closer to efficiency 
than if it ,~ere not liable. But under Posner's assignment rule, since the 
railroad would purchase the right if not assigned it (absent transactions 
costs) it would not be held liable. As a result, Posner's assignment rule 
actually chooses the option that leads to less efficiency and lower total 
conuibutes more to total product. However, under the total product rule, when transactions 
costs bar these negotiations, the "right to pollute" would be awarded tCo the firm. Since the 
largest increase in the firm's product is with a 100% pollution level, that is clearly what the firm 
would do if awarded the right. This results in a less efficient outcome than if the pollution 
rights were assigned to the farmer. 
62. See supra text accompanying notes 52·57. 
63. See supra text accompanying notes 46·51. 
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product-in contradiction of Coase's total product rule.64 Therefore, under 
either Coase or Posner's guidelines the total product rule does not 
guarantee, even as between the two parties, an assignment of property 
rights that will bring the parties as close as possible to economic efficiency. 
Furthermore, even if criteria could be developed that would assure 
consistent assignments of property rights so that the parties could achieve, 
as close as possible, their optimal use of the right and produce their optimal 
output, this attempt to maximize the efficiency of the two parties would not 
ensure that society's efficiency, as a whole, would be improved. This is 
because changes in the market for any given product reverberate through-
out the economy. Assume, for example, that in the firm-farmer hypothet-
ical,65 the parties are in court, seeking the award of the property right with 
respect to pollution in the river. Assume further that significant transac-
tions costs prohibit negotiations between the parties concerning the alloca-
tion of that right. The court's assignment of the property right will 
determine what output the two parties will ultimately produce. If the 
assignment is made to the firm, the firm will overproduce and the farmer 
will underproduce. If the assignment is made to the farmer the opposite 
will result. If the firm is given the assignment and overproduces, this will 
tend to lower the price for the paper it produces. Therefore consumers will 
tend to buy more paper and less of other goods. This change in consump-
tion will affect the total product of society in some way. The same will be 
true if the assignment is given to the farmer, causing the firm to 
underproduce. This would raise the price of paper, causing consumers to 
buy more of other goods. This also affects the total product of society. This 
effect occurs whether or not the assignment is such that the two parties to 
the dispute end up, between themselves, as close as possible to efficiency. 
Without full and complete data about the effects throughout the 
economy, one cannot predict a priori which assignment results in the 
greatest total product. In fact, the aggregate effect cannot be predicted by 
any general economic rule. The only way to determine whether a particular 
right assignment generates a net gain or loss over alternative assignments is 
to engage in an extensive data analysis not only of the disputing parties but 
also of all the potential reverberations throughout the economy-an 
undertaking usually beyond the scope of most COUrts.66 Since the ultimate 
economic outcome of an assignment rule based on Coasian total product analysis is 
unpredictable, the assignment rule itself is not logically justifwd on economic 
eJfzciency grounds. Furthermore, as a corollary, an assignment based on rules of 
equity and property is, a priori,just as likely to create the greatest net gain (or loss) 
in aggregate total product as one based on a total product analysis of the disputing 
parties. 
64. For analyses suggesting that liability (and not the property right) should be assigned to 
the party with the lowest transactions costs, see Mishan, supra note 52, at 267-69, and Randall, 
Market Solutions to Externality Problems: Theory and Practice, 54 AM. J. AGRIc. ECON. 175, 178 
(1972). 
65. See supra note 31 and accomp?I1ying text. 
66. Gunther, Forward, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1972) (discussing inability of courts to 
address some kinds of social and economic problems "because the data are e.'(ceedingly 
technical and complex"). 
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In the example above, it was assumed that the assignment of the right 
would not lead the two parties to their optimal outcome. Instead, they 
would merely move as close as possible to that point. This assumption does 
not, how<:ver, affect the conclusion that the assignment of the property 
right according to a total product rule does not assure an improvement in 
societal efficiency. Even if the rules could be designed to guarantee the 
optimal outcome between the disputing parties, applying the rules still doe& 
not ensure that society'S (economic) welfare has improved overall. 
Economists have demonstrated rigorously that when constraints on 
efficiency (such as transactions costs barring negotiations) exist throughout 
the economy, applying policies to induce efficiency between some of the 
parties is not necessarily or even likely to be an economic improvement for 
society as a whole.67 Indeed, it is possible that permitting fewer parties to be 
efficient is economically superior to making many (but not all) parties 
efticient. Therefore, applying policies to bring as many parties as possible 
to economic efficiency may not lead to the greatest total product for society. 
When many parties in society are constrained from achieving an 
economically efficient outcome, bringing only some of those parties to their 
economically efficient outcome will have a ripple effect on other parties in 
society. Once again, without exhaustive data, the courts cannot know in 
advance whether the increase in total product that results from the 
disputing parties being made efficient will be offset by a lessening of total 
product for other parties that stems from this maximization process. 
Formalized as the Theory of the Second Best,68 the analysis proves 
that the intuition-that it is economically superior to achieve as many 
efficient conditions as possible-is wrong. It is true that society achieves a 
maximum total product when all markets are efficient simultaneously. But as 
the Theory of the Second Best demonstrates, once the economy in fact 
departs from this ideal, the second best solution does not consist of 
myopically evaluating each individual dispute for the purpose of maximiz-
ing efficiency between the two parties as a way of maximizing total product 
for society. This, however, is precisely what the Coasian analysis suggests for 
public policy. Even when the Coasian analysis can (if ever possible) provide 
assignment rules that satisfy optimal conditions for the disputing parties, 
applying the rules as law actually may have the economic effect of lowering 
overall product. 
67. See, e.g., Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11 
(1956). 
138. Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 67, was published four years before Coase's article, The 
Problem of Soc tal Cost, appeared. Coase may have been unaware of the pioneering work that was 
being undertlken by Lipsey and Lancaster (as well as others) at the time he was writing his 
paper. Howeller, the Theory of the Second Best is not an obscure theory; it is well-known and 
often cited in many articles published in mainstream economic journals. See, e.g., McManus, 
Comments on the General Theory of Second Best, 26 REv. ECON. STUD. 209 (1959). It is at least 
referred to, if not explained in some detail, in every leading undergraduate te.'{t used to teach 
economics m:Uors. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, Sllpra note 3, at 461-62. 
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B. The Redistribution of Wealth 
If in fact Coase's policy recommendation to follow the total product 
rule does not necessarily accomplish its purpose, the rule gives doubtful 
guidance for legal disputes in which economic efficiency is the goal. One 
must ask, then, what effect the total product rule does have. One way of 
determining its impact is to analyze it in a functional sense, that is, to look 
at when and how the rule operates. As shall be seen, such an analysis 
demonstrates that in fact the total product rule operates as a wealth 
redistribution scheme tending to favor the economically advantaged.69 
Many commentators have criticized the Coase Theorem in an effort to 
undermine the validity of Coase's policy recommendation.7o Their motiva-
tion in attacking the theorem seems to be, or can at least be viewed as, a 
response to an intuitive recognition that the policy recommendation has a 
built-in bias favoring large corporations and others who are economically 
advantaged at the expense of the less advantaged. These critics obviously 
believe that the only way to attack the policy recommendation is to attack 
the theorem underlying it. 
The total product rule, however, fails as a policy based on economic 
efficiency-even accepting the validity of the Coase Theorem.71 The total 
product rule is independently vulnerable. While the Coase Theorem may 
be analytically faulty,72 the failure of the total product rule to enhance 
economic efficiency does not rest on the invalidity of the theorem. 
Good reasons support the conclusion that Coase's policy recommen-
dation does embody an inherent bias in favor of the economically 
advantaged. The concept of "maximizing total product"73 tends to favor 
69. A number of writers have addressed the issue of the wealth effect of Coasian analysis. 
They primarily focus on the wealth implications of the Coase Theorem, however, and not on 
the redistributive effects on his policy recommendation, which is an entirely different matter. 
These writers focus on how the assignment of liability affects the relative wealth of the parties 
and whether this undermines the validity of the Coase Theorem. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 6, 
at 13; Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 19-28 (1972); 
Kelman, supra note 15, at 678-95; Mishan, supra note 52, at 269-8l. 
70. In addition to the sources cited supra note 6, see Cooter, supra note 44; Polinsky, 
Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis 
of Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1655, 1669-80 (1974). 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68. 
72. Cooter, supra note 44, at 14-24, contains an excellent discussion of the inherent 
problems with the Coase Theorem. 
73. This expression and ones similar to it, such as "maximizing utility," "maximizing social 
welfare," and "maximizing joint production," are used in many different ways to mean many 
different concepts, by both economists and noneconomists alike, often within the same article. 
The references cited in the footnotes of this Article as well as this Article itself are replete with 
examples. There is a rigorous notion in economics of increasing the level of society's 
satisfaction from the available resources (i.e., Pareto Optimality) that motivates the use of these 
expressions. However, there are limitations on that notion that are significant for policy 
purposes, ,the important ones of which are discussed infra text accompanying notes 103-12. 
These limitations are often obscured if not altogether lost when verbal concepts such as 
"maximizing total product" are used. In part, this is an inevitable result of transferring a 
scientific concept such as the modem day version of Pareto Optimality to the literary 
framework of law and applying it to issues that arise there. The reader should be alerted that 
reasonable inferences drawn from such terminology may not be meant or intended by the 
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entrepreneurial activities. In the typical property right dispute envisioned 
by Coase and Posner, the parties usually would consist of a large corpora-
tion implementing technological advances and a small individual entrepre-
neur or private citizen. In using Coase's approach to maximizing total 
product, a court would be unlikely to find that the large corporation is not 
adding more to the economic pie than the small entrepreneur or land-
owner. An assignment of the right to the small landowner would be seen as 
preventing the corporation from producing, thus leaving society'S total 
product the same as it was before the corporation came onto the scene. 
Assigning the right to the corporation, however, would be perceived as 
permittin;5 the addition of the entire total product the corporation is 
e,rpected to produce, at the expense of "minor" intrusions on the rights of 
a few individuals surrounding the corporation. Thus the corporation must 
win when the courts use as a criterion the relative product of the parties. 
Such bias is further enhanced when the corporation faces only a fe,v 
representatives of a much larger class. In that instance, the extent of the 
class and the extent of the right deprivation cannot be fully evaluated by the 
court. The court, then, will underestimate the collective value of the right 
to the members of the class in comparison with the value of the right to the 
corporation, thereby further increasing the probability that the corporation 
wiII win. 
The inherent bias in favor of the economically advantaged is merely 
one manifestation of the wealth redistribution effects of the total product 
rule. Anor.her indication of the redistributive impact stems from the total 
product rule's selective impact-the rule has effect only when it makes an 
assignment of a right that varies from the one that would be made using 
traditional property rules. If traditional property rules would dictate that A 
has the right, but the application of the Coase-Posner total product rule 
would require that B should be assigned the right, then dearly the shift of 
the wealth resource from A to B is a redistributive effect. However, the total 
product rule will not always require such a transfer. One party may be 
entitled to the right by virtue of both traditional property law and the total 
producfl rule. But recalling that the total product rule itself does not 
promote economic efficiency,74 then obviously in these cases the rule serves 
no independent purpose. Therefore, the only remaining conclusion re-
garding the total product rule's effect is that it serves solely to redistribute 
wealth. 
The redistributive aspect of the total product rule also can be seen by 
examining what could happen if the courts adopted the total product rule 
for resolving legal disputes generally. Since the rule ostensibly purports to 
remedy the interference with efficiency created by the presence of trans-
actions costs, then in cases in which transactions costs are a barrier, the use 
of the total product rule would not be inconsistent with that purpose. Yet 
when transactions costs are not interfering with negotiations-which may 
or may no;:. be discernible by the court-and the parties are merely seeking 
authors. Even in instances in which such inferences are intended, they may be wrong. The 
discussion infra note 108 should make this point clear. 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68, 103-18. 
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to resolve a property right dispute, then the application of the total product 
rule to assign the property right contrary to the assignment dictated by 
traditional property law can only serve to redistribute wealth. In this sense 
the total product rule is overinclusive. 
The question also arises whether the rule is necessary to overcome the 
effects of transactions costs. For example, given that transactions costs 
create inefficiencies in the marketplace, the maTketplace may be the most 
efficient forum to resolve those impediments. If the marketplace can 
overcome the barriers, then the assignment of property rights according to 
traditional property rules will not interfere with the achievement of 
efficiency. If so, then the total product rule lacks justification, reaffirming 
that, as a practical matter, the rule serves solely to redistribute wealth. 
For an example illustrating how the marketplace can overcome 
transactions costs, reconsider the railroad-farmer hypothetical75 that pur-
ports to demonstrate the need for the total product rule to avoid economic 
inefficiency and social loss. In the hypothetical, the railroad is spewing 
sparks onto the landowner's property and causing crop damage. In the 
absence of transactions costs the railroad would pay the farmer not to grow 
crops on that portion of the land exposed to the sparks. The amount the 
railroad pays the farmer is small enough .so that the railroad can still 
operate profitably and large enough to induce the farmer to accept the 
offer. Transactions costs, according to the hypothetical, prevent the rail-
road from negotiating with the landowners in advance so that crops will not 
be grown. As a result, the farmers grow their crops and the railroad 
damages a portion of them. If the railroad is held liable for the damaged 
crops, not only are the damages greater than the railroad would have paid 
if it had been able to negotiate in advance, but the damages are so large that 
the railroad is no longer profitable and goes out of business. The railroad's 
crop damage liability exceeds what the advance payment would have been 
because the advance payment represents only the profits lost by the farmer 
from not growing the crops. Crop damage liability, however, represents the 
market value of the damaged crops that includes not only lost profits, but 
also the costs of growing the crops as well.76 
The purpose of this example is to demonstrate the usefulness of the 
total product rule. The result that occurs if there are no transactions costs 
(i.e., the railroad pays the farmer in advance not to grow the crops) is an 
economically efficient outcome. The result that occurs when there are 
transactions costs and the railroad is held liable for the damages (i.e., the 
railroad goes out of business) is clearly an inefficient outcome. According to 
the hypothetical, the only solution seems to be the assignment of the right 
to the railroad-thus providing compelling evidence of the need for a total 
product rule. Posner further points out that assigning the property right to 
the railroad leads to an outcome very similar (although not identical) to the 
one that would have occurred were there no transactions costs, and the 
parties could negotiate.77 That is, the railroad, no longer liable for any crop 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51. 
76. To review the earlier discussion, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying te.xt. 
77. R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 18. 
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damage, remains in business; the farmer, knowing that compensation for 
crop damage is not available to cover damages that exceed the profits from 
the crops, will choose not to grow crops. The only difference between the 
original efficient outcome and the Coasian total product outcome is that the 
railroad, and not the farmer, keeps the forgone profits. 
This example raises the question whether the solution of assigning the 
property right to the railroad is necessary to overcome the transactions costs 
effect. If not, then Coase's solution exemplifies how the total product rule 
operates merely to redistribute wealth. In this example, Coase implicitly 
assumes that markets do not induce efficient behavior in response to 
transactions costs.7S That is, he assumes that the parties lack sufficient 
incentives to overcome the effects of the transactions costs. Coase wrongly 
assumes, however, that an efficient outcome may be achieved only by 
reassigning property rights. Even in the railroad-farmer hypothetical with 
transactions costs the railroad will not go out of business if it is made liable. 
The market grants more than one route to the efficient outcome; the 
negotiations in advance with all the landowners are not the only means. 
The railroad could offer to buy the land from the landowners. Economi-
cally, this is exactly the same as offering to compensate tlle landowners for 
the forgone profits, for it is a well-known economic fact that the price of any 
piece ofland is equal to the present (discounted) value of its future flow of 
profits.79 )f the railroad negotiates with the farmers in advance, it would 
have to compensate them for the forgone profits each year. Since the 
railroad presumably intends to operate over a long period of time, 
purchasing the land accomplishes the economic equivalent of paying for 
the profits each year and does it more efficiently as well, since negotiations 
are concluded in one period rather than repeated over time. 
Not only would the purchase of the land yield the same efficient 
outcome absent transactions costs, but the railroad should prefer to buy the 
land rath(:r than negotiate with all the landowners in advance. If the 
railroad buys the land then it need buy only from those owners who 
suffered damage sufficiently large to make it worth their effort to contact 
the railroad. This strategy would cost the railroad less than negotiating to 
pay all the adjacent landowners, whether or not they experienced signifi-
cant damage.so Thus, although it is possible to portray scenarios in which 
transactions costs bar one route to achieving economic efficiency, this does 
not mean that the marketplace will not find another one.81 In this light, the 
necessity for a total product rule to overcome transactions costs becomes 
highly questionable. 
78. This is ironic since both Coase and Posner are strong advocates of reliance on the 
marketplace .md are, in general, opposed to governmental interference to resolve economic 
pr(,blems. SCI' Coase, supra note 2, at 17-19; see also R. POSNER, supra note 54, passim. 
79. This proposition shares such wide recognition that it appears in Judge Posner's book 
(albeit in a different example from Posner's illustrations of the Coase Theorem). See R. POSNER, 
supra note 54, at 30-32. 
80. Even the courts recognize the advantage to the defendant of "buying out" the potential 
plaintiff when the prospects of compensatory damages appear too onerous. See Union Oil Co. 
v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974). 
31. For an acknowledgement of the existence of market efficiency with respect to 
transactions costs, see Randall, supra note 64, at 181. 
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Not only does Coase underestimate the ability of the marketplace to 
resolve inefficiencies, he also underestimates the ability of the courts to 
fashion decrees that are both equitable and efficacious in overcoming the 
inefficiencies caused by transactions costs.82 Thus, in his example, Coase 
assumes that the right must be assigned either to the farmer or to the 
railroad. In this "either-or" scenario, assigning the right to the farmer puts 
the railroad out of business, and assigning the right to the railroad results 
in a taking of the farmer's use of his land. Coase fails to address the. ability 
of the courts to issue equitable decrees that leave the parties in the position 
they would have been in had there been no transactions costs and the 
parties had bargained to an efficient outcome. For example, Coase over-
looks the fact that the court could declare that traditional property rules 
dictate that the farmer owns the right to the land but efficiency consider-
ations dictate that the farmer's damage award be limited to a sum equal to 
the forgone profits from the crops.83 This remedy leaves the farmer to 
mitigate damages without depriving him of total use of his land. That is, the 
farmer decides whether or not to grow crops but does so at his own risk 
since the court has already determined that the farmer may collect only the 
lost profits and not damages for lost crops. Thus the courts could correct 
inefficiencies generated by transactions costs without making either one of 
the parties worse off. 
82. Coase is not alone in this error. Posner fmds it "unrealistic to expect courts to discover 
the optimum [combination of property right assignments]-and uneconomical to make them 
search too hard for it!" R. POSNER, supra note 54, at 45. As the discussion in the text indicates, 
such a judgment denies the equitable dimensions of the issue and thus does not reflect judicial 
experience to fashion suitable remedies. 
83. In fact, the courts have fashioned exacdy this remedy in the area of nuisance law. For 
example, in Lassiter v. Norfolk & C.R. Co., 126 N.C. 509, 36 S.E. 48 (1900), a real-world 
dispute between a farmer and a railroad, the court awarded "permanent damages" equal to the 
change in the market value of the farmer's affected land. The reasoning of the court parallels 
the analysis in the text quite closely. The quotation speaks for itself: 
If the damage ... will probably recur from a given state of things which the defendant 
refuses to change, and which the Court from motives of public policy will not make 
him change, permanent damages are allowed as the only way of doing justice to the 
plaintiff, and at ·the same time preventing interminable litigation. As far as the 
plaintiff is concerned, permanent and recurring damages are the same to him, if they 
equally result in the destruction of his property. The latter are in some respects worse 
than the former, as they merely prolong his agony, and may cause even greater loss. 
For instance, if a farmer knows that the railroad has acquired a right to [harm] his 
land, he will not plant it; whereas, if he relies upon their subsequent forbearance 
from unlawful injury, he may suffer not only the damage to his land, but also the loss 
of his labor, seed and fertilizer. In other words, the loss of the crop means the loss of 
everything that has been put into the crop. 
Id. at 514,36 S.E. at 49. Generally, the courts take the following posture: 
Where a permanent nuisance is involved and for reasons of policy courts will not 
abate it by injunction, the tortfeasor acquires what amounts to an easement to commit 
the nuisance, on payment of the depreciation in market value. Some courts, 
apparendy on the theory that the "easement" is not acquired until the tortfeasor pays 
the depreciation, have allowed the plaintiff in permanent nuisance cases to recover 
not only the diminution in his land value by reason of the nuisance, but also any 
special damages, such as loss of crops, which he suffered before trial .... 
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 638. 
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C. The Constitutionality of the Total Product Rule 
Coase's total product rule with its reassignment of property rights 
without compensation raises serious constitutional questions relating to the 
state's power to regulate or take property for the public use. Coase, in 
effect, teHs the courts that if society's total product would be improved by 
awarding the property to one party, they should do so even though the 
effect of the ruling does not include compensation for the party deprived 
of the ril~ht.8'1 Coase's approach would permit the courts to treat this 
reassignment of rights as an exercise of police power regulation rather than 
ali a taking, by using a unidimensional analysis of economic efficiency 
rather than the multifaceted balancing test historically demanded by the 
courts for making such distinctions.85 The multifaceted balancing test 
considers, inter alia, the extent of the deprivation, the substantiality of the 
public interest, whether the owner is being discriminatorily singled out for 
such treatment, and to what extent the regulation frustrates "distinct 
investment-backed expectations."86 The overarching considerations in de-
termining whether an act of regulation constitutes a taking and thus 
requires compensation, however, are '~ustice and faimess."87 
This much more comprehensive balancing test might well dictate 
different i:esults than Coase's narrower total product rule. 'Vhereas Coase's 
approach would always require a finding that the state merely exercised its 
regulatory police powers, the court's balancing test might well conclude that 
the reassil~nment of the right constituted a taking which requires compen-
sation. Of course, this does not mean that the balancing test would not 
sometimes lead to a conclusion that the reassignment was a proper exercise 
of police power. Therefore, there are instances when the Coasian analysi~. 
and the traditional balancing test would yield the same results and instances 
where they would not. 
The balancing test could consistently support Co asian analysis if the 
total product rule invariably enhanced economic efficiency over traditional 
property right assignments. Promotion of economrc efficiency would 
provide the preponderant or substantial public interest necessary to sustain 
an exercise of police power regulation.88 The total product rule, however, 
does not ::r.lways enhance economic efficiency89 and to that extent, it cannot 
satisfy the substantial public interest requirement. Without this substantial 
public int':!rest aspect, the state is merely shifting property rights from one 
party to another in a dispute between two private parties and cannot justify 
84. See wpm note 51 and accompanying text. 
85. See L')retta v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982) (using 
balancing test to distinguish between police power and taking in instances of government 
intrusions short of permanent physical occupation). 
86. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
87.Jd. at 123-24. 
88. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 (198-l) (approving land 
redistribution scheme designed to correct deficiencies in market to l:;nd oligopoly); see also G. 
GlNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 486 (11th ed. 1985) ("What is a public rather than a private use 
is often a fl>11ction of ... economic theory .... "); Merrill, The EconomICS of Public Use, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 66-93 (1987) (discussing use of economics to define public use). 
89. See SlApra text accompanying notes 58-68. 
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the invasion of traditional property rights without compensation.90 There-
fore, applying the Coasian rule in such instances, even though it would not 
promote economic efficiency, would facilitate the functional equivalent of 
taking of private property without compensation.91 
Indeed, without a guarantee of improved economic efficiency, 
whether a court could reassign the pr,'pel'ty right even with compensation 
is problematic. The public use doctriue requires that the state take property 
for a public rather than a private use.92 Although judicial review of such 
issues has been very deferential to the decisions of government,93 nonethe-
less, the court does require "a conceivable public purpose."94 Without an 
assured result of increased economic efficiency, the total product rule lacks 
public purpose and a court would not permit a reassignment of private 
property rights to another private party. 
In most regulatory taking cases the court reviews legislative actions.95 
Legislative enactments tend to confirm the substantial public interest claim, 
because, unless a problem has become sufficiently pervasive, the legislature 
would not likely deal with it.96 In contrast, the Coasian approach would 
90. CJ. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (preponderant public concern may arise 
from need to preserve one set of private interests at expense of another). 
91. The courts have clearly recognized the constitutional issues with regard to propeny 
right reassignments made in the public interest. Lassiter v. Norfolk & C.R. Co., 126 N.C. 509, 
36 S.E. 48 (1900), involved a railroad-farmer dispute similar to the hypothetical posed supra 
text accompanying notes 41-46. The Lassiter coun, supporting a lower coun's decision to 
reassign, in effect, the farmer's right to undamaged crops to the railroad on public policy 
grounds, addressed the compensation issue: 
Railroads are quasi public corporations, charged with important public duties, 
which in their very nature necessarily invoke the power of eminent domain, and 
therefore the courts, with practical unanimity, have created a species of legal 
condemnation by the allowance of so-called "permanent damages." ... It is true that 
the works of certain quasi public corporations are not liable to abatement on the 
theory that to interfere with such workl; might seriously affect the proper perfor-
mance of their public duties; but this does not exempt them from liability for any 
unlawful damage .... [I]f [the railroad] takes the easement, it must pay for it .... Any 
attempt to do [otherwise] would be unconstitutional. 
126 N.C. at 512-15, 36 S.E. at 49,50 (emphasis added) (without affecting the coun's meaning, 
the sequence of the sentences have been somewhat modified to facilitate the reader's 
comprehension). For related analysis from this case, see supra note 83. 
92. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1984) (discussing scope of 
public use); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (rejecting claim of public 
use for statute that granted mandatory access to railroad's propeny on behalf of private pany). 
93. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("The role of the judiciary in 
determining whether [the eminent domain] power is being exercised for a public purpose is 
an extremely narrow one."). Compare Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1689, 1726 (1984) (takings jurisprudence has "a core of prohibited action that is more 
sharply defined than anything under the contract or due process clauses."). 
94. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
95. "[I1he necessity for appropriating private propeny for public use is not a judicial 
question. This power resides in the legislature, and may be exercised by the legislature or 
delegated by it to public officers." Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923). See 
generally Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y. U. L. REv. 
409 (1983). 
96. Some writers in the area of public choice question whether the solutions offered by the 
legislature are truly in the public interest. See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCH, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); D. LEE & R. McKENZIE, REGULATING GoVERNMENT (1986); 
Buchanan, Qpestfora Tempered Utopia, Wall St.J., Nov. 14,1986, at30, col. 4. Richard Epstein'S 
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have the courts exercise what appears to be a nonjudicial regulatory 
function in the context of two private parties bringing a property dispute to 
the judiciary for resolution. These disputes do not guarantee the same 
indicia of public interest that legislative actions do. Therefore, in these cases 
the present law suggests that the parties be left as they were.97 
Whether the total product rule tends toward more economically 
efficient rt::sults than the current police power/taking analysis is also 
questionable, even by Posner's standards. In all those cases in which the 
court would be at variance with Coase's results-that is, when the court 
would find a taking98-the court's determination mirrors more closely the 
economic outcome that would have occurred absent transactions costs 
barring negotiations. When the court finds a taking, the court, in effect, 
assigns the property right to the party with the greater total product, that 
is, the parties representing the public interest;99 to that extent, the court is 
congruent with Coasian principles. Traditional taking law parts company 
with Coase at this stage, however, because the finding of a taking requires 
compensation, whereas the total product rule does not. 100 The court's 
finding of a taking and ordering of compensation accomplishes the 
economic t:quivalent of the parties privately negotiating in the absence of 
transactions costs when the purchasing party buys the right because he 
critique of modern takings doctrine shows a marked influence by public choice theory. See R. 
EpsrEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985) (regulations, 
ta.xcs, and modifications of liability rules must be included in takings analysis because "[t]hose 
who are in control of the state will find in the unregulated forms of conduct effective 
substitutes for those initiatives called into question under the takings clause."); id. at 104 ("The 
current rela.x' d approach to regulation skews the incentives for political groups by making one 
form of state action subject to powerful constitutional control while leaving its close substitutes 
wholly unregulated."); see also id. at 161-81 (discussing and criticizing current public use 
doctrine); Ep:itein, judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CATO J. 711, 712 (1985) 
("When the power of coalition, the power of artifice and strategy come into play, it often turns 
out that legislatures reach results that (in the long as well as short run) are far from the social 
optimum."). The claim made by public choice adherents, however, does not dispute the 
proposition that the problems addressed by the legislature are affected with public interest. 
Compare Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1133-35 
(1986) (Constitution prohibits use of political power to implement "naked preferences" of 
interest groups); Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1723-27 (consideration of "naked preferences" 
prohibition in context of eminent domain and takings). 
97. See H~waii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) ("the Constitution 
forbids even a compensated taking of property when executed for no reason other than to 
confer a priv~lte benefit on a particular private party."). 
98. This, o)f course, does not include those cases in which the courts find that the 
government's actions were solely for private purposes. 
99. "When forced to [make] a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by 
deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the 
judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public." Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 
279 (1928) (government's requirement that private owners destroy cedar trees infected with 
disease threatening apple industry was proper exercise of police power though not a taking). 
"In determin1ng whether the taking of property is necessary for public use, not only the 
pre'lent demands of the public, but those which may be fairly anticipated in the future, may 
be considered." Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (citing Central Pac. Ry. 
v. Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 309 (1907». 
100. "rAJ strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
ECONOMICS FOR THE COMMON MAN 603 
values it more. IOI Thus the court's traditional approach more accurately 
mimics the marketplace without transactions costs than does Coase's total 
product rule. I02 
This result is not surprising, because in all taking cases, the court, in 
effect, uses economic analysis via the balancing test it applies in making its 
determination. The conclusion that a particular action constitutes a taking, 
however, is not dictated by the court's use of economic analysis. The 
conclusion is dictated instead by value judgments that can include economic 
factors, but that are also based on principles of fairness and equity. In all 
the taking cases, the court implicitly acknowledges that a barrier to 
economic efficiency exists and that society'S efforts to overcome this barrier 
must be judged by whether that attempt unfairly burdens one party with 
the costs of overcoming the barrier. If the court finds a party has been 
unduly burdened, the court does not sacrifice economic efficiency in the 
name of justice, it merely requires that some other means of overcoming 
the inefficiency must be found. In effect, the court chooses one of the 
possible routes or channels to several of the possible states of economic 
efficiency. Thus, the court's decision determines who will own society'S 
resources and this decision stands on principles of equity. 
D. The Multiplicity of the Economically Efficient States 
Perhaps the most fundamental flaw underlying the Coase-Posner 
analysis is an implicit assumption that only one economically efficient state 
exists. I03 This assumption is necessary to justify the reassignment of 
property rights contrary to traditional property rules. Because Coase and 
Posner view the economically efficient state as unique, they conclude that 
any action that improves economic efficiency is unambiguously good for 
101. Of course, when the negotiated outcome would have led to an apportionment of the 
right between the parties, the court may be able only to estimate what that apportionment 
might be. However, the court remains truer to the goals professed by Coase and Posner than 
the wholesale uncompensated reassignment of the right that they recommend. See supra note 
61 and accompanying text. 
102. For a discussion of another author's view that compensation is essential for economi-
cally efficient government exercise of eminent domain, see infra note 118. 
103. Coase's general discussion with regard to "total effect," see Coase, supra note 2, at 42-44, 
implies a belief in one unique maximum output. This is also a necessary assumption to make 
in order for the conclusion of the Coase Theorem to be correct (i.e., that regardless of how 
property rights are initially assigned, not only will they end up in the hands of the party who 
values them the most but also that the economic outcome is unaffected by the assignment). 
The conclusion of the Coase Theorem, as it was originally expressed, has since been disproved, 
primarily by recognizing that, in any society, there are a multitude of different economically 
efficient states that can be achieved from the same set of available resources. The text 
immediately following this footnote explains why more than one efficient state is possible. For 
further comments on the matter as it relates to the Coase Theorem, see Calabresi, supra note 
40, at 69-70; Cooter, supra note 44, at 1-14 (discrediting Coasian conclusion that resource 
allocation is invariant to assignment of liability.) 
Posner more explicitly expresses his belief that there is a unique maximum total product. 
For example, he writes" 'Wealth maximization' as a guide to governmental including judicial 
action means that the goal of such action is to bring about the allocation of resources that 
makes the economic pie as large as possible, irrespective of the relative size of the slices." 
Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 131, 132 
(1984). 
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society.I04 They fail to recognize that a course of action that improves 
economic efficiency may not be the only one that improves economic 
efficiency, or even the one that society prefers. In fact, a fundamental 
theorem of economics is that every society with a given amount of resources 
faces a multiplicity of economically efficient states from which to choose; \03 
th(! particu.lar efficient state toward which society gravitates reflects that 
society's social values. The demonstration of the multiplicity of economi-
cally efficient states for a given amount of resources is most widely 
displayed in the graphical analysis known as the Edgeworth-Bowley Box. \06 
Stated simply, the Edgeworth-Bowley Box shows that whatever initial 
distribution of goods exists in a given society, the members of that society 
have an incentive to trade among themselves as long as each of the trading 
partners wlnts more of one good than another and is willing to give up 
other products in order to obtain additional quantities of that good. As long 
as one party wants to give up a different good than the other party, and also 
wants something the other party is willing to surrender, the potential for 
trade exists. When the parties are no longer willing to trade because each 
party no lo.ager will give up what the other party wants in exchange for his 
or her goods, they have reached what is called economic efficiency.lo7 
Clearly, the rate at which the parties will exchange, the amount they will 
exchange, and when they will stop trading, is greatly affected by many 
factors. Included among these factors are: the personal idiosyncracies of 
the trading: partners with respect to the goods, the relative bargaining 
strengths of the parties, and most importantly, their initial endowments of 
wealth and resources. Obviously, if there are variations in any of these 
factors. then the economically efficient state that society will reach will be 
different.lo,~ 
104. "[RJedi;tribution is more effidendy carried out by the legislative branch .... [W]ealth 
maximization IS the only social value ..• that courts can do much to promote." Posner, supra 
note 103, at 133. "[\V]ealth-ma.ximization criterion ... requires, not that no one be made worse 
off by the move, but only that the increase in value be sufficiendy large that the losers could 
[but not neces:iarily would] be fully compensated." Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the 
Efficimcy Norm in Common Law A.djudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491 (1980). 
103. The phrase "given amount of resources available" means that at any moment in time, 
soci(·ty has a flllite amount of resources, such as land, labor, and capital, available to use as 
inputs for production. Society can allocate this particular amount of resources in a vast variety 
of ways, a large number of these ways being economically efficient. The text following this 
footnote explains this point further. 
101). See E. MANSfIELD, supra note 3, at 423-36; Bator, The Simple Anal)'tics of Welfare 
Ma:,1mizal;0Il, 47 AM. ECON. REv. 22 (1975). For a detailed explanation of the Edgeworth-
Bowley Box, s(:e infra note lOS. 
107. If the leader refers back to the rancher-farmer hypothetical, set supra note 31 and 
accompanying text, or the railroad-farmer hypothetical, see supra text accompanying notes 
48-51, the rea,' er will see that the parties in each hypothetical negotiate until neither is willing 
to "trade" (rig:1tS for catde or for crops or for rail services) any further. On that basis the 
parties are deemed to have achieved economic efficiency, that is, when they have negotiated 
for all the pot(·ntial gains from trade. 
108. The Ecgeworth-Bowley Box is a conglomeration of various concepts designed to 
dem(,nstrate the motives individuals have to trade and the factors determining the outer limits 
of the extent of trading. The analysis is appropriate not only for understanding trade between 
indh.cduals, but it also facilitates an appreciation for the optimal allocation of resources in an 
economy. Sinc,~ the medium of expression is primarily a graphical analysis, the number of 
factors that can be discussed in anyone exposition is limited. Therefore, the exposition here 
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is confined to an analysis of the incentives to trade after the goods have been produced and 
distributed. Readers interested in how the analysis applies to resource allocation should see E. 
MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 427-34. For interesting applications of the Edgeworth-Bowley Box 
analysis to legal issues, see Binningham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The 
Geometry oj Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49, 53-58 (using Edgeworth-Bowley Box to explain 
basis for contract); Westin, When One-E')'ed Accountants are Kings; A Primer on Microeconomics, 
Income Taxes, and the Shibboleth oj E.fJzciency, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1099, 1102-09 (1985) (using 
Edgeworth-Bowley Box to provide insightful perspectives on need to separate value choices 
from economic efficiency analysis for purposes of evaluating tax policy). 
The Edgeworth-Bowley Box analysis begins with several simplifying assumptions: there are 
two individuals, Ann and Bill; two goods, meat and potatoes; and a finite quantity of each 
commodity, e.g., 100 pounds of meat and 200 bushels of potatoes. Assume that there are 
various levels of satisfaction Ann and Bill each derive from different quantities of consump-
tion. Also assume that any given level of satisfaction can be achieved by differing combinations 
of quantities of meat and potatoes. This is based on the assumption that there is always some 
rate at which each individual is willing to substitute a portion of one commodity for a portion 
of the other and be indifferent between the choice of consuming the combination after the 
exchange or consuming the one prior to it. 
By portraying a particular level of satisfaction with an analytic concept called an "indiffer-
ence curve" in economics, the combinations of quantities of meat and potatoes that give the 
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The curves labeled 11 are each, respectively, Ann and Bill's indifference curves. Points 1 and 
2 on Ann's curve represent nvo different combinations of meat and potatoes that give Ann 
equal levels of satisfaction. Any other point on the curve also represents a combination that 
gives her the same level of satisfaction. Similarly, points 1 and 2 on Bill's indifference curve 
give hint the same level of satisfaction, and so forth. Any point above and to the right of Ann's 
11 curve represents a combination of goods that gives Ann a greater level of satisfaction than 
any point on Ann's 11 curve. In a parallel fashion, any point below and to the left of Ann's 11 
curve represents a combination of goods that gives Ann a lower level of satisfaction. Due to the 
assumption of substitutability of one good for another, we know that for each combination of 
goods, there are other combinations that yield equivalent levels of satisfaction. Therefore, if a 
particular combination is not part of I}. then it is part of some other indifference cun·e. An 
example of a combination yielding satisfaction greater than II is depicted on Ann's graph as 
point 3 and the indifference curve with which it is associated is drawn on Figure 2 using 
dashes. An example of a combination yielding less than II is depicted on Bill's graph as point 
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While it may appear that economic factors alone determine the 
4 with its a!.sociated indifference curve similarly plotted. Intuitively, one can see that there is 
a whole n.nge of indifference curves for each individual, and that between any two 
indifferenc(! curves there always lies a third that can be depicted if one chooses to do so. The 
collection (If indifference curves for each individual is referred to as that individual's 
"indifference map" and reflects that individual's tastes and preferences for meat relative to 
potatoes at different levels of consumption. 
The Edgeworth-Bowley Box is constructed by having Ann and Bill "face" each other 
through their respective indifference curves within the framework of a box that represents all 
the goods available for the two to consume. This is accomplished by "flipping" one of the 
individual's indifference map, Bill's in this case, to face the other: 
potatoes 


















The dimensions of the box represent the entire quantities of goods available for consumption 
by the two individuals; the width of the box represents 200 bushels of potatoes and the height 
of the box represents 100 pounds of meat. The construction of the box in this fashion is such 
that any point in or on the box represents a complete distribution between Ann and Bill of all 
the meat and potatoes available for consumption. For example, point F on the box represents 
the allocation where Ann is endowed with all the available meat and no potatoes and Bill is 
endowed with all the available potatoes and no meat. Point G, on the other hand, allocates all 
the meat to Bill and all the potatoes to Ann. Thus, once an allocation is made (i.e., a point in 
or on the boli. is selected) the only way Ann or Bill can improve their respective lots (short of 
one expropri.lting goods from the other) is to trade with each other. Trading with each other 
will only improve their lots if their preferences, given their endowments, are such that each is 
willing to give' up some of what the other prefers in exchange for what the other prefers to give 
up. 
Such potential gains from trade can be more rigorously explained through the following 
graphical analysis. Let E represent an initial endowment (arbitrarily chosen) for Ann and Bill, 
when Bill's initial endowment is Bp bushels of potatoes and Bm pounds of meat, and Ann's is 
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economically efficient state reached, in reality, the economically efficient 
state reached results in large part from value choices that society makes with 
respect to the initial endowments. Whether members of a society start out 
Ap bushels and Am pounds. From their respective endowments Ann and Bill each derive their 
own level of satisfaction, which is reflected in their respective indifference curves associated 
with their endowments. These indifference curves are labeled IA (for Ann) and IB (for Bill). 
Each can improve his or her lot by moving to a higher indifference curve, and the arrow on 
each current indifference curve indicates the direction of increase for that individual. Any 
point inside the intersection of the two initial indifference curves represents an allocation that 
puts both Ann and Bill at higher levels of satisfaction, i.e., at higher indifference curves. For 
example, point H is such a point, where the associated indifference curves have been partially 
drawn. Since H is a point in the box, it is a feasible allocation and therefore a possible trading 
result. Ann and Bill have an incentive to trade as long as at least one of them can improve his 
or her welfare as a result. The incentive to trade ceases once no more such additional gains can 
be made. Graphically, this occurs when Ann and Bill reach an allocation where their respective 
indifference curves do not intersect but are, instead, tangent to each other. Point C represents 
such a case, where again the indifference curves are partially drawn in. Clearly, no further 
improvements can be made through trading at point C because, unlike at point H, in order for 
one of the individuals to move to a higher curve, the other must necessarily move to a lower 
one; this is the result of the absence of trading "space" between the two indifference curves. 
In fact, between any two intersecting indifference curves there are a number of tangent 
curves, thus making a number of ultimate trading outcomes possible. See, e.g., J. GOULD & C. 
FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 423-27 (5th ed. 1980). Without more information about 
Ann and Bill's bargaining skills, which trading outcome actually will occur cannot be 
determined in advance. One can say unequivocally, however, that whatever trading outcome 
will occur, it will lie within the intersection of the two indifference curves associated with the 
initial endowments, i.e., within the area defined by the intersection of lA and lB. 
From an economic standpoint, the initial endowment represented by E is inefficient. Both 
Bill and Ann can each improve their well-being, at no cost to the other, by reallocating the 
commodities between themselves, which they w.ill accomplish through trading. The movement 
from point E to an ultimate trading point such as C represents an increase in efficiency, and 
C is an efficient point. Moving from point E to point C, or any other efficiency point within 
the trading space, is the same as ma.ximizing total product. 
What Coase and Posner suggest, however, is not an efficiency move such as that from E to 
C. Instead, they advocate a change in the initial endowment (e.g., taking the right away from 
Ann and giving it to Bill), which is graphically the equivalent of moving, not from point E to 
inside the trading space but from point E to a point such as K. They justify this transfer on the 
grounds that, on some basis (usually by an evaluation using market prices), the gain to Bill 
exceeds the loss to Ann. See infra text accompanying notes 117-18 (discussing problems of 
using market prices to make such evaluations). Once such a reassignment is made, the trading 
area is changed. The economy (in this case, comprised of Ann and Bill) will move to one of the 
new set of efficient points, i.e., those contained within the intersection of the indifference 
curves associated with point K. Thus, Coase and Posner's total product rule is not an effort to 
move the economy from an inefficient point such as E to an efficient point within the 
economy's trading area, such as C. Instead, the policy advocates changing the trading area, 
which in turn changes the efficiency state toward which society itself is moving. Furthermore, 
casual inspection of the graph makes it clear that the reassignment of the right not only favors 
the assignee, Bill in this case, but the efficiency points that represent maximum total product 
also favor Bill. In other words, if point E is viewed as the initial endowment according to 
traditional property rules, which are based on principles of justice and fairness, the reassign-
ment of the right according to the total product rule not only moves Ann and Bill to point K, 
but it also assures that, whatever equilibrium society will now reach, it will be one in which Bill 
is on a higher indifference curve and Ann is on a lower one than either of them would have 
been on before. 
For insightful analysis of other ramifications of the Coase-Posner total product rule, also 
using the Edgeworth-Bowley Box, see Coleman, Effzciency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic 
Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 221 (1980); Coleman, EffICiency, Utility, 
and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509 (1980). 
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with equal or unequal shares of society's resources depends on that 
particular society's view regarding the morality of different allocation 
schemes. II)9 When Coase and Posner make their policy recommendations, 
they claim merely to be interested in overcoming transactions costs barriers 
that inhibit parties from freely negotiating to the economically efficient 
outcome.110 They believe they have accomplished this goal when they 
provide an economic efficiency justification for reassigning property rights. 
But reassigning property rights redistributes initial endowments and thus 
constitute:; a value choice. Moreover, while the Coase-Posner choice in 
reassigning rights may move society more readily toward an economically 
efficient state, almost invariably that state will not be the same economically 
efficient st.ate toward which society was moving before the property rights 
were reassigned. This is because the Coase-Posner policy recommendation 
operates only when it assigns rights differently from the way traditional 
property rules assign them. III Thus, when Coase and Posner reassigr.. 
property lights, they implicitly make a value determination conCern;.11g 
which economically efficient state that society will achieve. Although th'y 
argue that economics dictates their assignment, in fact it does not. 
Although Coase and Posner may grant that they have made a value 
choice, they may still argue that it is better for society to move to a different 
economically efficient state than to stagnate because transactions costs 
render sodety unable to reach the economically efficient state toward which 
it is currently moving. At the very least, though, that argument does not 
preclude compensation for the party losing the right. As was shown earlier, 
there are other ways of overcoming transactions costs that either do not 
involve reassigning property rights (and thereby leave unchanged the 
economically efficient state toward which society is moving) or that reassign 
the property rights based on legal principles of equity and fairness. 112 
Not only does the total product rule change the economically efficient 
state toward which society moves, it also chooses one that favors the party 
to whom Coase and Posner would reassign the right. Because this party has 
more wealth than previously, the party has a greater effect on the choice of 
109. Most notably, the existence of both a "capitalistic" distribution of private property 
rights and a "socialistic" distribution of collective ownership reflects the sharp divergence of 
wealth distributions that result from different moral principles governing who has the right to 
own what. These differences in property rights also affect what is going to be produced and 
who is going to receive it. The ultimate production and distribution of goods in each society 
represents an efficient state that results from the initial distribution of resources. Different 
initial distributions of resources lead to different economically efficient states. The criticisms 
leveled by supporters of the capitalistic distribution of private property at the socialist 
distribution of collective ownership really address the question whether the implementation of 
the socialist values simultaneously erects barriers to the economy reaching the efficient state 
as~eciated with its distribution scheme. This point, however, is often confused with the issue 
of the economic merit of socialist values. 
110. See Coase, sllpra note 2, at 16, quoted supra note 42; see also R. POSNER, supra note 54, 
at 491: 
We have seen that the ultimate question in many lawsuits is what allocation of 
resource:; would maximize efficiency. The market normally decides this question, but 
it is given to the legal system to decide in situations where the costs of a market 
determination would exceed those of a legal determination. 
Ill. See sllt'Ta text accompanying note 74. 
112. See sllt'Ta text accompanying notes 75-83. 
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production of goods and services than it did before. Thus, the makeup of 
the economy's production will reflect the preferences of the newly endowed 
individuals to a greater degree than before the reassignment, thereby 
changing what constitutes maximum total product for that society. lIS In 
other words, Coase and Posner's total product rule redefines the content of 
maximum total product in favor of the parties to whom the rights have 
been reassigned.1I4 
Coase and Posner's argument that their theory is the sole way to assure 
maximization of total product stems from their belief that a unique 
maximum total product exists. But as the analysis above demonstrates, a 
multiplicity of maximum total products exists, each associated with a 
different distribution of wealth embodying different societal value 
choices.1I5 Thus society'S goal to maximize total product by reaching 
economic efficiency is not synonymous with Coase and Posner's total 
product rule. The latter simply chooses one particular kind of maximum 
total product, a kind that may not accord with society's choices.116 
Another difficulty with the total product rule is that there are many 
ways to measure improvements in economic efficiency. Coase offers no 
analytical basis for ascertaining which improvement most benefits society. 
113. Posner seems to acknowledge this point to some extent in Wealth Maximization and 
Judicial Decision-Making, supra note 103. The article is a rejoinder to Samuels & Mescuro, 
Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 107 (1984)r who make a 
related observation on wealth-maximization and distribution throughout their article. Posner, 
however, aJ>pears to be unconcerned with the implications and says: 
This is true in the sense that the prices which determine value in a system dedicated 
to wealth maximization depend ultimately on how wealth is distributed in the system; 
there will be a different pattern of demands and therefore different prices if it is 
highly concentrated than if it is highly equalized. But courts cannot do anything 
about the distribution of wealth, so they might as well just take it for granted, as a 
responsibility which the political system has allocated elsewhere. 
Posner, supra note 103, at 133. However, Posner is wrong; the court does, in fact, do 
something about distributional issues every time it makes a decision on right assignments. 
Though explicit redistribution can be and is affected by other arms of the government (e.g., 
taxation and various income subsidies such as welfare and unemployment insurance), this does 
not mean that distributional issues are not intricately involved in judicial disputes. 
114. In recent years Posner has modified the arguments he uses to support his position, 
presumably in response to criticisms questioning the veracity of many of his economic 
assertions. He refined his posture to support an ethical norm he refers to as "wealth-
ma.ximization." Fundamentally, he argues that all forms of voluntary transactions should be 
permitted in society, including controversial ones such as selling babies, see Landes & Posner, 
The Economics of the Bally Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), and slavery, see R. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF jUsrlCE 86 (1981). For a highly imaginative article that gives an insightful slant 
on the true nature underlying Posner's notion of voluntary consent, see West, Authority, 
Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and 
Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985); see also Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free 
Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1431 (1986); West, Submission, Choice, and 
Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1449 (1986). 
115. Accord Lachman, Knowing and Showing Economics and Law, 93 YALE LJ. 1587, 1595-98 
(1984) (illustrating value-Iadden nature of "efficiency"). 
116. For an excellent analysis of society's choice of values as expressed through e.xisting 
restrictions on liability and entitlements, see generally Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the 
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1985). 
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In fact, the determination of the preferred improvement requires consid-
eration of noneconomic social values. 
It is often argued that society's preferences can be ascertained in a 
scientific manner by examining the market prices established for the 
various ~roods the economy produces.1l7 This argument asserts that the 
market prices reflect not only the costs of production of these goods but 
also society's demand for them. In other w·ords, if many members of society 
want a particular good and want it to a great extent, they will offer to pay 
higher prices to secure it. Thus, it is argued that the prices people are 
willing to pay for the good reflect how much value they receive from it. 
However, people's willingness to pay for a product is not determined by 
their desire for the good alone; the wealth and income of each individual 
also affects it. Even though two persons may have equal desires for a 
particulai: commodity, if one is wealthy and the other is not, clearly, at some 
price the wealthy person will still purchase the good, but the other one will 
not. Since society is comprised of people of varied tastes, different distri-
butions of wealth will give different people greater power to affect prices 
and then!fore production in the market. Any given set of prices found in 
any given marketplace reflects the tastes and preferences of society under 
the given distribution of wealth and income. I IS 
It is debatable whether the use of these prices as the measure of 
potential social improvement is appropriate when evaluating a policy that 
proposes to redistribute initial endowments. Any change in the distribution 
of wealth necessarily changes the market prices. If market prices are used 
to assess the improvements, they should at least be the ones established 
after the redistribution occurs, not the prices from before the redistribu-
tion. Even this, however, does not answer the question whether the 
redistribution improves social welfare, since that answer requires a subjec-
117. See, t.g., Muris & McChesney, The Effects of Advertising on the D..Jv.zlity of Legal Services, 65 
A.B.A. J. !!i03, 1504 (1979) (society's preferences in legal services should be determined by 
price consumers are willing to pay); Note, An Economic Analy;is of Tort Damages for Wrongful 
Dtath, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113 (1985) (individual preferences should determine efficient price 
for a life in wrongful death actions). 
118. Professor Durham makes a related point regarding the appropriateness of using 
market pric.~s to determine the required compensation for takings. See Durham, EfflCientJust 
CompensatiOll as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1277, 1278-79 (1985). He argues 
that market price~ tend to understate the true cost to the owner of a taking and as a result lead 
to an inefficient use of the government's right of eminent domain. Durham's efficiency 
analysis is r·~miniscent of Pigou's (i.e., it rests primarily on the view that all costs should be 
internalized, see supra text accompanying notes 19-25), and thus reflects a belief (somewhat 
similar to Coase's and Posner's) that only a single economically efficient state exists. In not 
recognizing the multiplicity of economically efficient states, see supra note 108 and accompa-
nying text, hoth perspectives fail to recognize the true purpose of the eminent domain right 
and the judicial process that constrains it. Durham's approach is designed to preserve the 
existing distribution and the efficient states associated with it. Coase and Posner's approach 
changes the distribution radically without acknowledging the equity issues involved. The 
traditional judicial analysis of police power, however, implicitly recognizes that a multiplicity 
of efficient states exists and that states change as society and the economy changes. Therefore 
under such drcumstances the government and the courts appropriately consider a reordering 
of the wealth distribution, which benefits society as a whole, but they do so only under the 
strictest guidelines designed to preserve constitutionally protected rights and the principles of 
fairness and equity. See supra text accompanying notes 84-102. 
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tive judgment that transcends market prices. Finally, these market prices 
reflect private decisions made without consideration of greater societal 
implications. Therefore, when policymakers consider proposals for social 
change they evaluate benefits that do not currently exist in the marketplace. 
Since the market prices have been established without considering those 
benefits and their distributional impact, the market prices present a 
distorted picture of the value of those benefits. Consequently, the use of the 
marketplace as a measure of improvements for social change is not a 
value-free indicator and should be used with considerable caution. 
III. COASE IN THE COURTS 
The basic thrust of Coase's approach is that economic considerations 
can and should be dispositive in resolving legal disputes. His analysis 
implies that the attainment of economic efficiency is not only essential but 
also sufficient for assuring societal well being. Coase's analysis in his article 
assesses welfare solely by the increase achieved in the quantity of goods and 
services as measured by market prices. His examples and analytical discus-
sions rely on this market method of measuring improvements in societal 
welfare.119 In the article's final section, however, Coase acknowledges that 
"the choice between different social arrangements for the solution of 
economic problems should be carried out in broader terms than ... [the 
market value of production] and that the total effect of these arrangements 
in all spheres oflife should be taken into account."120 Coase did not resolve 
this basic tension between economic determinism and broader social goals. 
His successors have largely ignored this aspect of his discussion, focusing 
instead on remedies that use the parameters of the marketplace as the sole 
measurement of increases in society's welfare. Because these supporters 
view market prices as an expression of society'S values, they believe they 
have found a value-free way of applying economic analysis to ..achieve the 
unique solution to maximizing social welfare.121 As previously noted, 
however, market prices may not accurately reflect society'S preferences for 
the assignment of property rights, thus the use of market prices may 
constitute a value choice at odds with societal mores.122 Moreover, effi-
119. See Coase, supra note 2, at 43 ("In this article the analysis has been confined, as is 
common in this pan of economics, to comparisons of the value of production, as measured by 
the market."). 
120. See id. Even though Coase adds these few sentences toward the end of his article 
acknowledging the importance of including dimensions other than economic efficiency in 
social policy decisions, this disclaimer is gready overshadowed by the article's pervasive tone 
proclaiming that economic efficiency is a sufficient goal in itself. 
121. See R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 10 (" 'Efficiency' means e.xploiting economic resources 
in such a way that 'value' - human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay 
for goods and services-is maximized."); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 96 (1986) ("Most investors need not expend resources on 
search; they can accept the market price as given and purchase at a 'fair price.' "). But see 
Levmore, Explaining Restitution,.71 VA. L. REv. 65, 75 (1985) ("So any attempt to resolve the 
conflict between D and E through a cost-benefit analysis based on a single set of market prices 
will inevitably be distorted."). 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18; see also Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical 
Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 700 (1985) ("[f]hey pretend 
neutrality by 'balancing' [interests]. But whereas the value choice in a 'balancing' test is fairly 
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ciency analysis alone does not determine a unique solution to legal disputes. 
Economic efficiency analysis will only reveal the existence of a multiplicity 
of economically efficient states-it wiII not reveal which one of those states 
is most desirable or beneficial to society. That choice must be made 
pursuant to a value system based on society's morals, ethics, and legal 
principles, none of which market prices accurately reflect. 123 By mingling 
economic analysis and value choices, Coase and his proponents have 
obfuscated the real virtue of economic analysis, which is to discern what the 
economically efficient choices are rather than which efficiency choice to 
make. 
Interestingly, in spite of the presentation by Coase and his supporters 
of economic analysis as determinative in legal disputes. the courts intu-
itively recognize the true analytical usefulness of economic reasoning. 124 An 
examination of the judicial opinions that cite Coase directly makes this 
point particularly clear. In those seventeen cases125 the courts consciously 
obvious, cost-benefit analysts can smuggle in their preferences and thus give their tinkering 
with the e:{isting distribution of wealth the sham rigor of scientific rationality."). 
123. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING 
AMERICi\l'l LAw 80-93 (1984) (economic analysis can be used to support different political 
view~). 
12·1. One clear example of the judiciary's awareness of the distinction between using 
economic analysis to discover an efficient means to a chosen end, and using it to make value 
choices, can be found in a presentation on the responsibilities of regulatory agencies made 
recently by Supreme Court Justice, then-Judge, Antonin Scalia, at a conference sponsored by 
the University of Houston Law Center. A former University of Chicago Law School professor, 
Justice Scalia has frequently expressed interest in the nexus oflaw and economics. During his 
presentation, he emphasized that value choices are subjective decifions that cannot be made 
through any process of economic determinism. He asserted that economic reasoning can and 
should be used to assist in the discovery of what those value choices might be, but ultimately 
the determination of choice must be based on principles other than economic reasoning. He 
argued thai in the area of administrative law, the responsibility of making these value decisions 
lies with the appropriate regulatory agency and, therefore, the court should exercise great 
deference. Justice Scalia gave two examples: one in which the regulatory agency gives an 
erroneous ('conomic argument to justify i~ chosen means, and the other in which the agency 
is faced with two competing value choices. These examples, he claimed, demonstrate when the 
court should and should not interfere with the agency's determination. 
[For example, if the agency chooses not to reduce a regulatory constraint because] 
the agency's prediction [is] that ... although [relaxing the constraint] will save 
materid costs, we can't be sure that the manufacturer will pass thOle material costs on 
to the consumer even though the market is fiercely competitiye[,] I guess that that 
really ,"ould have finally pushed me over the edge and I would have said that is a 
prediction not even a mother could love .... 
[On the other hand, t]he outcome of cost benefit analysis in the broad sense ... is 
particularly difficult for a court to second guess when it inyolves weighing the impact 
of a proposed action upon two quite different social values. For example, ... aesthetic 
values versus full employment, or minor health risk versus low consumer prices. How 
can on(' say, except at the remote margins, that a particular call is right or wrong 
when you are weighing apples or oranges. 
Addrer.s by Judge Antonin Scalia, University of Houston Law Center Conference Rethinking 
Tort and Enviromelltal Liability Laws: Needs and Objectives of the Late 20th Century and Beyond (Apr. 
18, 1986) [hereinafter Scalia Address]; see also Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulating Agencies Under 
Envirollmentt!l Laws, 24 Hous. L. REv. 97, 100-01 (1987) (revised remarks). 
125. To research the impact of Coase's article, The Problem of Social Cost, mpra note 2, on the 
courts I employed a computer search to retrieve every case citing the name "Coase" since 1960 
(the year in which his article was published). As of August 14, 1986, the search revealed 21 
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use economic analysis, yet most courts reject economic determinism and 
base their decisions on other factors. 
These seventeen cases represent a microcosm of the extent to which 
courts use economic reasoning in their legal analysis. Some make merely 
incidental use of economic analysis, others use economic reasoning as an 
integral part of the judicial analysis; in two, the courts appear to use 
economics as determinative in reaching their conclusions. In every case, 
though, the courts had to resort to broader social policies to make their 
decisions. 
A. Conventional Uses of Economic Analysis 
At one end of the spectrum are those cases in which economic analysis 
does not playa maJor role in either the court's reasoning or in its ultimate 
conclusion.126 For example, the United States Supreme Court majority 
opinion in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman127 seems steeped in 
economic analysis because it considers a great number of economic factors. 
However, the majority's analysis draws very little from the process of 
economic reasoning. On the other hand, economic reasoning plays a 
significant role in the arguments of the dissent. Economic factors are data 
about goods and services being produced,128 while economic reasoning is 
cites from both federal and state courts. Two cites were discarded because they merely referred 
to Coase in the title of an article by another author. Two were reported too late to include in 
this analysis. 
126. Ironically enough, Judge Posner's opinion for the panel decision in Analytica, Inc. v. 
NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983), illustrates such de minimis use of 
economic reasoning. The court had to decide whether the plaintiffs law firm, which once 
assisted in the transfer of stock from the defendant corporation to its (now former) employee, 
should be barred from the current case on the grounds that a law firm may not represent an 
adversary of its former client if the subject matter is substantially related. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.9(a) (1983); see also International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 
F.2d 1288, 1292 (2d Cir. 1975) (counterclaim against plaintiff for attorneys' fees did not 
render firm counsel to plaintiffs, so firm was not disqualified from representing defendants); 
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(prior association with firm representing defendant did not disqualify attorney representing 
plaintiff); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973) (previous 
representation of defendant disqualified counsel representing plaintiffs in patent litigation). 
Although the law firm had been the sole legal representative in the prior transaction between 
the defendant corporation and its employee, the law firm argued that its actual client was the 
employee and not the defendant corporation. Judge Posner responded that this contention 
was irrelevant because, in effect, all parties engaged the firm and had done so for economic 
reasons, i.e., to save on attorneys' fees. He cited Coase's article with a if. signal to support the 
proposition that conducting a transaction at a lower cost benefited everyone. In affirming the 
lower court's disqualification order, however, Judge Posner stated that whatever entity 
employed the law firm in this previous transaction was in fact irrelevant to the legal issue. 
Precedent dictated that the law firm's access to confidential information of the defendant 
corporation would be the crucial factor. See 708 F.2d at 1268-69. Thus, the court's invocation 
of economic reasoning comprised a minor portion of the opinion, and it essentially played no 
role in reaching the result. Furthermore, the economic analysis itself was little more than an 
application of common sense and the cite to Coase's article was more ritualistic than 
appropriate. 
127. See 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
128. Courts routinely use economic factors to assist in determining issues such as the 
measure of damages. For instance, the reduction of a future income stream to present value 
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an analytical process characterizing behavior and decisionmaking in re-
sponse to various incentives. United Housing addresses whether stock issued 
by a nonprofit cooperative housing corporation constitutes securities within 
the meaning of the Security Act of 1933.129 Both the majority and the 
dissent consider a number of different factors, including the economic issue 
of whether the particular stock in question was purchased for the purpose 
of earning profits. The majority looks at whether meaningful profits could 
be earned by the stock, whether the stock could be sold at an appreciated 
value, and whether there was a legal basis for considering tax savings and 
below-market rents a form of earning profits. The majority answers the 
questions l:legatively and concludes that the stock is not a security for the 
purposes of the Act.130 Although the majority looks at economic aspects of 
the problem, it does not engage in economic reasoning. Justice Brennan's 
dh,sent argues that earning profits can take forms other than capital 
appreciation and participation in earnings. Drawing on economic reason-
ing, his dissent points out that an investor makes no distinction between tax 
savings and after-ta."{ income, and therefore money saved is just as much a 
form of profit as money earned. lSI This analysis is a type of economic 
reasoning because it assists the Court in recognizing the similarities 
between seemingly disparate forms of transactions based on their economic 
realities. m 
Similarly, in Powers v. United States Postal Service,133 the economic 
reasoning is not as intrinsic to the judicial analysis as in other cases, though 
its role is qualitatively greater and more integral to the decision than in 
United Housing. Judge Posner addresses the question whether state law or 
federal common law governs lease disputes between the United States Post 
Oftice and landlords. The particular dispute before the court involved a 
landlord in Indiana seeking to terminate a long-term lease with the Post 
Office in which the rents, due to inflation, were particularly favorable to the 
Post Office and unfavorable to the landlord.134 
Proceeding under the assumption that application of state law would 
cause the Post Office to lose its favorable lease,135 Judge Posner evaluates a 
requires application of many economic factors that affect the value of future income. See jones 
& Laughlin S):eel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 538·53 (1983). 
129. See 421 U.S. at 840. 
130. See id. at 840·60. 
131. See id. at 863·64 (Brennan, j., dissenting). 
132. The dissent cites Coase in addition to P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (9th ed. 1973), for the 
proposition tj-,at ventures undertaken for the purpose of generating tax savings are as much 
a form of income as participation in a venture that generates earnings or capital appreciation. 
There could be no more appropriate supporting source for that proposition than the eminent 
Ecollomics, a mainstay economics textbook which has been used around the world for over forty 
years in major universities. Coase's article, on the other hand, though it uses elementary 
economic analysis, is not concerned with, nor does it make any comment on the issue of 
savings versus earnings. It is not clear why the author of the opinion, justice Brennan, chose 
Coa~e's article as supplementary support for the proposition. 
1:13. 671 F.~!d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982). 
1:14. See id . . it 1041·42. 
135. Posner makes this assumption in order to examine the arguments for application of 
federal common law in a light most favorable to them. Later in the opinion, after determining 
that state law should apply, Posner gives some arguments why state law would not dictate 
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number of reasons that would justify applying federal common law. 
Supreme Court doctrine on the choice of federal common law compels 
Posner to consider whether the Postal Service requires nationally uniform 
or distinctive treatment in its leases, whether the state law intentionally 
discriminates against the Postal Service or threatens its effectiveness, and 
whether the application of federal common law would reduce the Postal 
Service's cost of operation. 13& 
Judge Posner applies economic reasoning to answer the last ques- . 
tion.137 He argues that even if the application of federal common law would 
avoid the loss of low rent resulting from an eviction, this cost savings would 
only be in the short run. Landlords, Judge Posner says, would charge the 
federal service higher rents to compensate for differences in their rights 
under federal versus state laws.13S In this view, not only would application 
of federal common law generate no cost savings,139 but, Judge Posner 
(incorrectly) argues, average rents would also likely be lower if state law 
were applied.140 
Judge Posner finds the other arguments favoring federal common law, 
such as those stemming from the concern for national uniformity and 
avoidance of discriminatory treatment, also unpersuasive. 141 Furthermore, 
he contends that federal common law on landlord-tenant relations does not 
exist,142 and that its application would require the federal courts to fashion 
one, a task that he thinks the federal courts would not do well.143 As a 
result, Judge Posner decides that state law should apply.l44 
Though economic analysis does not comprise a major portion of the 
opinion, Judge Posner uses fairly sophisticated economic reasoning to 
address an issue he feels is important. He engages in a market analysis 
(albeit, an incorrect onel45) to determine a priori whether the cost of postal 
termination of the lease. He remands the case to the lower court for a hearing on this issue. 
See id. at 1044-46. 
136. See id. at 1044-45. 
137. In fact, Judge Posner considers the issue of reduction in costs before considering any 
of the other issues. This may reflect the primacy of the economic issues in his thinking. See id. 
at 1044. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. (Posner cites Coase with a "cJ." signal for support though connection is not 
readily apparent). 
140.Judge Posner's economic reasoning is wrong because rents would go up only in those 
states in which federal common law is less protective of landlords than state law. In those states 
where federal law is more restrictive on the tenant, the rents should actually go down. Without 
exhaustive information about the actual impact in each state, it is impossible to predict 
whether application of federal common law would in fact raise or lower costs for the Postal 
Service, indicating again the problem arising from focusing solely on the parties to the dispute. 
Posner certainly has not found, as he implies, see id. at 1045, any a priori reason for believing 
that costs will move in one direction or the other. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. Though Posner cites United States v. Certain Property in Manhattan, 306 F.2d 
439, 444 (2d Cir. 1962), in support of this assertion, he does not reconcile the claim with the 
lower court's finding that since the Postal Service was subject to federal common law, it was not 
owed the painting services from the landlord. 
143. See 671 F.2d at 1046. 
144. See id. 
145. See supra note 140. 
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services would be affected by the decision. He does not, however, draw 
e::clusively on his economic conclusion for the disposition of the case as a 
whole. He considers a number of factors other than economic ones that 
concern both the Postal Service's ability to function and the federal court's 
ability to rule. 146 
Whether Judge Posner would have resolved the case the other way had 
he found a real cost saving in applying federal common law is unclear. He 
observes that any cost savings to the Postal Service is due solely to a 
redistribution from the general taxpayer to the Indiana citizen and not 
from a lo\vering of social costs. Savings of social costs arise from efficiency 
gains and usually are reflected in lower costs of production. The cost 
savings to the Postal Service in Powe-rs would result from a reallocation of 
those costs to different parties. Posner concludes, therefore, that a reallo-
cation of costs alone does not justify a finding in favor of federal common 
law since it would generate no net change in societal welfare.147 Whether 
Judge Posner finds economic efficiency determinative in deciding legal 
disputes, however, is not discernable here; his findings on the other legal 
factors alw support the use of state law. Absent finding an improvement in 
economic efficiency to support a particular decision, Judge Posner consid-
ers legal factors and legal reasoning necessary to his decision. 
The economic reasoning used in the Powers case is not transcending; it 
is one consideration in a multifaceted judicial approach that weighs all 
factors equally in reaching a conclusion. Powers is thus materially distin-
guishable from those cases in which economic analysis forms the core of the 
court's reasoning process. The centrality of the economic reasoning may 
not be immediately apparent in each of these cases, because much of the 
analysis i~ of a kind used both in economics and in law. Many areas of the 
law evolved reasoning processes identical to those developed by economists 
to resolve similiar issues. 148 One such example emerges in Nelson v. United 
146. See 671 F.2d at 1044-45. These factors include whether or not state law would be 
sufficient to deal with the intricacies of federal programs, whether there would be discrimi-
nation toward federal programs under state law and, finally, whether there would be problem~ 
with uniformity across state lines. 
147. See U1. at 1044. Posner makes a value judgment when he concludes rJIat a redistribution 
alone does not represent a change in societal welfare. To see this, imagine that Indiana is. 
c(.incidentally, the richest state in the nation and that Indiana's landlords are the nation'!, 
\'/I:althiest landlords. If the costs are redistributed away from the less advantaged average 
tal:payer ar d charged to the better-off Indiana landlord, even though actual costs are 
unchanged, under some value systems society's welfare is still improved. Judge Posner'~ 
implicit value system in Powers is that interpersonal transfers of wealth have no impact on the 
measure of society'S welfare regardless of the equity, or lack of equity, in the initial 
endowment'!. 
148. The best known examples of the similarities between legal reasoning and economic 
reasoning are the balancing test, the cost-benefit analysis, the theories of accident reduction, 
and the theories of deterrence. These cover a broad spectrum of legal fields. See, e.g" 
McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme C()urt's Unanswered QyJestions and 
Qu.estiunable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 49 (1985) (discussing Court's use of cost-benefit 
analysis to evaluate professional advertising); Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence 
in Strict Products Liability, 67 MINN. L. REv. 343, 349 (1982) (mentioning significance of accident 
reduction in theory of strict liability); Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. 
L. REv. 713, 774 (1986) (noting importance of deterrence in antitlust enforcement); Note, 
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States,149 in which the focus is on the reduction of the risk of accidents. Since 
the legal and economic communities each have addressed the problem of 
risk reduction, it is not surprising that the two disciplines have developed 
essentially the same analysis. Risk reduction is, however, only one possible 
policy approach that a court might take when resolving accident disputes; 
other alternative approaches also are av2ilable.l50 Accident disputes are 
not the only legal issues for which a menu of policy choices exists. 
Competing policy considerations often face a court when it resolves any 
particular dispute. Only some of these policies require the kind of reason-
ing used in economics in order to reach an appropriate result. When the 
court makes a decision to emphasize one policy over another, it chooses to 
favor the societal concerns promoted by that policy over those of the 
alternatives. The policy chosen may, by its very nature, call for the 
application of economic analysis to resolve the dispute. This is not the same 
as the Coase-Posner view that courts should endeavor wherever possible to 
apply economic reasoning to each case in order to determine the "unique 
efficient resolution."I5I 
In Nelson v. United States,I52 the court is quite conscious that it might 
have to choose between possibly competing social values. The court focuses 
on whether, under the Restatement of Torts, an owner's duty to protect 
"others" from unreasonable risks of harm includes liability for harm caused 
to the employees of a hired independent contractor. I53 Two competing 
concerns trouble the court. One is that allowing the employee to file a 
traditional tort claim against a fortuitous third party owner would permit 
the possible circumvention of workers' compensation laws limiting damages 
for job-related injuries. I54 The other is the need to minimize the risk of 
accidents. I55 A resolution of the dispute in favor of the first concern 
employs a statutory analysis to determine whether in fact the employee in 
question is subject to the restrictions of workers' compensation laws. I56 To 
Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99 BARV. L. REv. 450, 466 (1985) (relating ad 
hoc balancing approach to political asylum law). 
149.639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980). . 
150. See infra notes 212, 238 and aa::ompanying te),."t. 
151. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing multiplicity of economically 
efficient states). 
152.639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980). 
153. See id. at 474 (interpreting REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965». 
154. Seeid. at 475. 
155. The coun recognizes that it is "choosing between a policy designed to reduce injuries 
by providing for the contractor's and owner's clear allocation of safety responsibilities, on the 
one hand, and the avoidance of perverse or fonuitous liability for injury on the other." Id. 
156. One problem is that the deceased employee had a possible cause of action against two 
different parties based on three different theories. First, he was entitled to a limited recovery 
from his direct employer, the independent contractor, based on the workers' compensation 
laws. Second, he had a possible cause of action against the general contractor, the government, 
on a theory of general negligence. Finally, as a seaman he may have had a statutory remedy 
under the Jones Act. The coun worried that allowing the employee to recover from both the 
independent contractor and the general contractor would allow all injured employees of 
independent contractors to recover more than that permitted by the policies underlying the 
worker's compensation law. Thus, merely by vinue of a peculiar position of employment, the 
employee of the independent contractor could circumvent the workers' compensation 
restrictions. 
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choose instead a policy of accident avoidance entails examining the 
particular facts and circumstances concerning the third party owner's 
knowledge, expertise, and capacity to contribute in any meaningful way 
toward avoiding the harm. This analysis, unlike the statutory interpreta-
tion, focm es on the relative capacities of individuals to affect the probability 
that certain events will occur and it is the kind of analysis engaged in by 
economists when dealing with problems of accident reduction.157 
The Nelson court first chooses to emphasize the policy of accident 
avoidance. It finds that holding the third party liable would not contribute 
to safety under the particular circumstances of the case. I5S The court 
implicitly acknowledges its application of economic reasoning to this issue 
by citing the work of Guido Calabresi, another advocate of the application 
of the use of economics in law.159 The court does not, however, rely 
exclusively on accident reduction analysis. It intenveaves its findings with 
other policy considerations, including the validation of the distinction 
between employers and independent contractors and the preservation of 
private contractual relationships.160 The court concludes that making the 
third party liable would undermine those interests without leading to any 
safety benefits and is therefore not justified. 161 The court further buttresses 
its arguments by noting that its decision avoids compromising the workers' 
compensation scheme.162 Thus, although the court elects to emphasize a 
policy that. uses economic analysis, its ultimate decision rests on the social 
ramifications of different policy choices.163 
157. For some economic discussions of accident reduction, see A. POLll\SKY, .AN INTRODUC-
TION TO Ecol>mncs AND LAw 37-49 (1983). 
158. The c·)un decides against holding the defendant liable because there was no evidence 
that the defendant was "in a better position ... to foresee and evaluate the best methods of 
protection" in comparison to the independent contractor's special expertise on the subject. See 
63!! F.2d at 478. 
159. See id. (citing G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL A.'1D ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970». 
160. See id. 
161. See id. at 479. 
162. The trial court believed that its decision did not compromise the worker's compensa-
tioll scheme because the decedent was eligible for extra remedies under the Jones Act by vinue 
of his status as seaman. The appellate coun points out the trial coun's error by showing that 
the decedent did not have a Jones Act remedy in this case because the government was the 
defendant and is exempt from Jones Act liability under the Suits in Admirality Act. See id. at 
478-79. 
163. Another group of opinions which concern used goods dealers demonstrate the use of 
economic reasoning to lay bare value choices even when the choices are not limited to ones of 
economic dimensions. Economic reasoning also discerns policies relating to fairness and 
equity. As JUitice Scalia noted, cost benefit analysis "is even helpful when one is not dealing 
with economic matters." See Scalia Address, sufrra note 124. In these cases the courts consider 
wh.:ther the application of strict liability to used goods should be the same as for new goods 
dealers. Based on a variety of policy considerations, the courts choose to circumscribe strict 
liability'S application, albeit in varying degrees. 
By its very nature, the application of strict liability calls for economic reasoning because strict 
liability is a policy decision to interfere with the marketplace. See gmeraUy Spence, Consumer 
Misperceptions. Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977). The 
doctrine serv'~s to'insure that certain standards of quality, durability, and safety are met by 
threatening enterprises with liability for damages if they fail to meet these standards. See 
Turner v. Int·~rnational Harvester Co., 133 N.]. Super. 277, 289, 336 A.2d 62, 69 (1975). The 
doctrine also assures access to compensation for victims of defective products. See id. For 
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B. Judicial Innovation Through Economic Reasoning 
Cost savings and risk reduction typically call for an economic approach 
and thus Powers and Nelson are good examples of conventional uses of 
further discussion of policy considerations underlying strict liability, see W. PROSSER & W. 
KEETON, supra note 19, at 692-93. The doctrine, however, has the economic effect of higher 
prices because manufacturers incur greater costs in meeting higher standards and providing 
funds to satisfy any claims. 
Although strict liability could be analyzed from an equitable perspective alone, the courts in 
the three cases discussed here use the economic aspects of strict liability as an analytical starting 
point. Actually the two 1ater opinions both quote a passage from Turner characterizing 
enterprise liability in this fashion. Enterprise liability is a policy of applying strict liability to all 
costs, direct and indirect, associated with a good distributed by an enterprise. Pigou's policy of 
internalization of all costs is consistent with enterprise liability, both of which impliedly adopt 
a policy of preserving initial ownership rights. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24; see also 
supra note 1l8. The passage from Turner inappropriately cites Coase for support of the 
economic justification of enterprise liability, which is ironic since Coase wrote his article with 
the specific purpose of destroying the economic validity of the Pigouvian approach. 
The courts begin their analysis by considering whether strict liability should be applied to 
insure that consumer expectations with repect to used goods are met. Turner v. International 
Harvester, 133 NJ. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975), rather cursorily concludes that public 
concerns for safety (but not quality or durability) mandate that '~ustifiable safety expectations" 
be met, holding that used goods dealers are liable if their goods prove to be "unreasonably 
dangerous." See id. at 289, 336 A.2d at 69. 
In Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979), the court agrees 
with the Turner court but decides against the imposition of strict liability without regard to the 
defendant's ability to affect the risk. See id. at 753-54,596 P.2d at 1302-03. Its decision is pased 
on what the court perceives would be the economic effect otherwise. The court reasons that 
imposition of strict liability to assure safety when used goods dealers could not affect the risk 
of accident would unduly restrict the flexibility of used goods businesses to make available a 
variety of goods under a variety oftenns. See id. at 755,596 P.2d at 1303. The value to society 
of such flexibility in used goods markets outweighs the merits of compensation for the victims 
when the used goods dealer could not in any way affect the risk of hann. See id. at 756, 596 
P.2d at 1303-04. In discerning that the imposition of strict liability might cost society the use 
of an essential feature of used goods markets, the Tillman court uses economic analysis to 
recognize all policy choices confronting it-the continuing flexibility of used goods markets as 
well as compensation for victims. 
The courts in these cases also use economic reasoning to discern issues of equity. In 
Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789 
(1980), the court, using an economic anaylsis similar to TiUman, argues that imposing strict 
liability on the used goods dealer who has no control over product safety works at irrational 
cross purposes with the objectives of strict liability policy. The court concludes that when the 
used goods dealer can not affect the level of safety and it could not pass the costs of strict 
liability to the responsible manufacturer, imposing strict liability would work an injustice. See 
id. at 283, 161 CaI.Rptr. at 798. 
In a similar vein, the Turner court uses economic reasoning to ascertain the equity of 
allowing the used goods dealer to escape liability if the good is sold with an "as is" disclaimer. 
See 133 NJ. Super. at 292,336 A.2d at 70-71. The Turner court applies economic analysis to 
demonstrate that various factors would affect the parties' relative bargaining position. That 
analysis pennits the court to find that the usual presumption, i.e., that the parties to an 
exchange are the ones best able to detennine its value, maybe inoperative. See 133 NJ. Super. 
at 293-94, 336 A.2d at 71. The Turner court thereby concludes that when the parties are in an 
unequal bargaining position to the disadvantage of the customer, it would be unfair to allow 
an "as is" disclaimer to isolate the used goods dealer from damages for which he would 
ordinarily be liable. See 133 N.J. Super. at 295, 336 A.2d at 72. By examining the possibility 
of control by the used goods dealer and the factors affecting the bargaining outcomes, the 
court is able to recognize issues of equity even when they are of a noneconomic dimension. 
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economic reasoning by the COUrts. l64 In Webster v. City of Houston165 and 
White Lake Improvement Association v. Whitehall,166 on the other hand, the 
courts' use of economic analysis is not traditional. One issue is particularly 
noneconomic, and another issue, though containing an economic compo-
nent, is traditionally analyzed from a noneconomic perspective. In these 
cases the courts' applications of economic analysis are more innovative and 
novel. 
In Webster the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to uphold ajury 
award of punitive damages against a city police department for tacirly 
encouraging police officers to use excessive force. 167 Webster, a teenager, 
was shot and killed by the police after surrendering to them at the end of 
a car chase. Officers placed a gun by Webster's side to make it appear that 
he was armed. This act was not an isolated incident but a general policy of 
cover-up condoned by the Houston Police Department and widely prac-
ticed throughout the Houston Police force. 16S The court interpreted the 
Supreme Court's decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 169 as 
precluding punitive damage awards except in egregious circumstances not 
present in the instant case.170 
Judge Goldberg, in a specially concurring opinion, disagreed with the 
view that Newport permitted punitive damages in egregious circumstances, 
arguing that if it did, the Websfe1' case would surely qualify.l7l Judge 
Goldberg criticizes the Supreme Court's opinion in Newport as overly 
broad. 172 In his view, Newport rests on the premise that awarding punitive 
damages against a municipality has no deterrent effect on governmental 
misconduct. Judge Goldberg agrees that this rationale supported the 
Newport ruling because the case involved only a single instance of miscon-
duct by individual high-level government officials (i.e., the mayor and the 
city council). In such cases, punitive damages would not deter the munic-
ipality because the individuals engaged in the misconduct do not pay the 
damages. That rationale, Judge Goldberg argues, does not work when the 
misconduct involves a pervasive governmental policy supported by collec-
tive action o~er time. 17:! Damages can have a deterrent effect in that case 
because the taxpayers will demand a change in governmental policy if the 
cost of the damage payments becomes excessive. Only by weighing the 
policy's benefits (i.e., encouraging aggressive police action to reduce crime) 
against its true costs (i.e., the killing of innocent people) will the govern-
ment "promote socially correct decisionmaking."174 In the Webster situation, 
164. The issues in Tillman. Tauber-Arons, and Turner-victim compensation. unequal bar-
gaining positions. satisfaction of e';pectations, continued existence of markets. as well as risk 
reduction-also evoke traditional economic analysis. 
165.689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982). affd on reh'g. 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984). 
166.22 Mich. App. 262. 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970). 
167. See 689 F.2d at 1223. 
168. See id. at 1221-23. 
169.453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
170. See 689 F.2d at 1229. 
171. See id. at 1231 (Goldberg. J .• concurring). 
172. See id. (Goldberg.] .• concurring). 
173. See id. at 1236 (Goldberg.j.. concurring). 
174. See id. at 1237 (Goldberg.J .• concurring). 
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not all instances of the harm caused by the policy are litigated because not 
all instances of the cover-up are detected. Since compensating damages 
punish the government only for harm for which it "got caught," the 
government is not forced to consider the true costs of its policies.175 In this 
situation, Judge Goldberg argues, punitive damages serve a deterrent 
function because government pays for the undetected harm.176 Thus 
punitive damages can serve to internalize the full costs of harmful acts 
which, after all, is a proper function of damages. 
Judge Goldberg's use of economic analysis is innovative. Only recently 
have economists turned their analytic skills to the issues of deterrence in 
intentional wrongs.177 Judge Goldberg's application of such reasoning 
represents an excellent example of how developing economic thinking 
about legal issues can readily reach the courts. The more traditional legal 
approach to punitive damages rests largely on theories of retribution and 
on vague notions of deterrence.17S Judge Goldberg's more refined (eco-
nomic) analysis on the internalization of costs permits a more rigorous and 
more accurate assessment of the role that punitive damages can serve. 
The innovative use of economic reasoning in White Lake Improvement 
Association v. Whitehall l79 illustrates how a court may independently em-
brace economic reasoning as a tool of its own. The court brings Coase's 
transactions costs concept to bear on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
The court held that although a nonprofit conservation association has 
standing to bring an action to abate a private nuisance, the association 
nonetheless must use the remedy provided by the administrative agency 
having primary jurisdiction over the claim. ISO In its discussion, the court 
applies economic reasoning to the primary jurisdiction issue-one that has 
not been explicitly addressed by economists, and one that appears to have 
no economic aspects calling for the use of economic reasoning. 
The White Lake court concludes that the plaintiff must pursue its claim 
administratively, but gives examples of situations in which the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction would not be appropriately invoked. The court states, 
"[i]n another case it might appear that immediate equitable intervention is 
necessary, that an administrative proceeding would not give the plaintiff 
the relief to which he is entitled." lSI The footnote appended to this 
sentence adds a transactions costs analysis: 
Indeed, to the extent that allocation of clear water among 
competing users is an economic problem, the optimal distribution 
of this resource is discouraged by legal obstacles which distort the 
175. See id. at 1238 (Goldberg,]., concurring). For further discussion of "true cost," see A. 
AsIMAKOPULOS, supra note 23. 
176. See 689 F.2d at 1238 (Goldberg,]., concurring). 
177. See generally Becker, Crime and Punishment: An EcoTUlmic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal TradeojJBetween the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 
Al-I. ECON. REv. 880 (1979); Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal use of Nonmonetary Sanctions 
as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232 (1985); Stigler, The optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. 
POL. ECON. 526 (1970). 
178. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 11-12. 
179.22 Mich. App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970). 
180. See id. at 270, 177 N.W.2d at 476. 
181. [d. at 283-84, 177 N.W.2d at 483 (footnote omitted). 
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bidding process between recreational and industrial users. We 
recognize that refusal of a court to entertain a case by invoking the 
conc(~pt of primary jurisdiction may raise the cost to the citizen of 
challtmging water pollution, and that adjustment of competing 
public and private claims will be delayed or prevented altogether 
if it becomes significantly less costly for industry to pollute waters 
than for private citizens to restrain their pollution. For an analysis 
of this problem of "transaction costs" see Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960).IS2 
The court makes an accurate and finely tuned application of Coase's 
thinking on the effects of transactions costs, with regard to an issue that 
Coase did not address. IS3 The court extrapolates the true meaning behind 
Coase's arguments divorced from any particular value judgment,IS4 and 
utilizes it for an issue that, at least superficially, does not seem to have any 
economic relevance. IS5 
The White Lake analysis demonstrates how economic reasoning can be 
m,eful for resolving legal problems that defy proper resolution by pure 
legal analysis alone. While courts often note the hardships created by the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine, they nevertheless feel compelled to apply 
it. 186 The footnote in White Lake provides a way of recognizing how 
invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine actually can work to deprive 
parties of lielief to which they are entitled. IS? By tying the economic analysis 
to the requirement that deference to an agency's primary jurisdiction is 
necessary only if the party can receive an adequate remedy, the court 
provides an economic basis for short-circuiting the primary jurisdiction 
requirement. This marriage of law and economics creates a synergistic 
effect, permitting the emergence of a more powerful tool for the resolution 
of legal disputes. 
In the cases discussed thus far, the courts have consciously used 
economic analysis but did not discuss the implications of using it. In the 
remaining cases the courts are more philosophical and analyze the useful-
ness and limitations of economic reasoning. Most courts explicitly recognize 
that economic analysis does not compel value choices and that different 
arguments, can support a variety of competing policy choices. 
Dobson v. Camden IS8 perhaps best exemplifies this approach. The court 
182. [d. at 283-84 n.32, 177 N.W.2d at 483 n.32 (last citation omitted). 
183. Although the Coase Theorem may appear to act primarily in suppon of large 
corporations, see supra text accompanying notes 73-74, the coun in White Lake uses the Coase 
Theorem on behalf of private citizens in a suit against the large industrial interest. 
184. Thus, from a neutral standpoint, the coun uses the Coase Theorem to come to a value 
judgment im:olicidy favoring fair and equal access to the courts. 
135. Although White Lake appears to be a typical nuisance case, in fact the case is a 
procedural d(~cision on whether or not to require the exhaustion of all administrative remedies 
before seeking judicial relief. 
186. See McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1979) (hardship is no excuse for not invoking 
agency's primary jurisdiction); see also C. WrJGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 
210-12 (3rd cd. 1976). For an understanding of the coun's authority on primary jurisdiction 
at that time, l:ee White Lake, 22 Mich. App. at 280 n.27, 177 N.W.2d at 481 n.27. 
187. See 22 Mich. App. at 283 n.32, 177 N.W.2d at 483 n.32. 
188.705 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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faced a choice between the "one-satisfaction" rule (the Texas rule concern-
ing joint tortfeasors when one settles before trial)l89 and the policy of 
deterrence in civil rights cases. In Dobson a restaurant manager had the 
plaintiff arrested because the manager suspected that the plaintiff might 
attempt to avoid paying his bill. While in jail, plaintiff was severely beaten 
by police. The restaurant settled with plaintiff out of court before trial. The 
police officers went to trial and, in addition to the restaurant, one of the 
officers was held liable. The jury awarded total damages for the collective 
harm caused by all joint tortfeasors in an amount less than the amount 
already collected by plaintiff from the restaurant alone. The police officer 
claimed he was not obliged to pay his share because plaintiff then would be 
overcompensated.190 The court frames the issue as one of competing 
principles: compensation and deterrence. l9l The majority concludes that 
the deterrence principle should predominate over the "one-satisfaction" 
rule. 192 After making that policy decision, the majority then uses economic 
analysis for two purposes. The first task, as in the Webster case,193 is to 
demonstrate that the achievement of socially optimal deterrence requires 
that the defendants pay the full costs of their misconduct. The second 
purpose is to justify the court's decision to ignore the distributional impact 
(i.e., the overcompensation of the plaintiff) by asserting that socially optimal 
deterrence requires that result. Thus the court notes: "A potential 
tortfeasor's action will probably not be shaped by considerations of whether 
the injured party will be compensated nearly as much as they will be shaped 
by considerations of whether the tOrtfeasor has to pay."194 Based on that 
reasoning, the majority concludes that the police officer must pay his share 
of the damages. 
Judge Higginbotham's dissent in Dobson also uses economic reasoning, 
but reaches a different conclusion. First, he argues that the police officer 
need not actually pay the damages to promote deterrence. 195 The mere 
threat alone, he says, would be sufficient deterrence and would not be 
mitigated by a fortuitous settlement.196 Second, while objecting to the use of 
economic analysis at all, Judge Higginbotham further asserts that the 
majority's application of it to support its deterrence rationale is flawed. In 
his view, the police officer does not receive the benefits that society does 
from more aggressive law enforcement, so forcing the police officer to 
internalize the costs may lead to aless than optimal level oflaw enforcement. 197 
189. The essence of the rule is that once the victim has been fully compensated for his 
injuries by one or more tortfeasors, the remaining tortfeasors owe him nothing, no matter how 
great their fault, absent punitive damages. Id. at 763. 
190. See id. at 768-69. 
191. See id. at 764. 
192. See id. at 766. 
193. See supra text accompanying notes 167-78. 
194.705 F.2d at 770. 
195. See id. at 772-73 (Higginbotham, j., dissenting). 
196. See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). In fact, however, Justice Higginbotham's analysis 
is not quite complete. If the police officer knows that there is a positive probability-no matter 
how small-of not having to pay for the full consequences of his actions, his decisions will not 
take into account the full true costs of his behavior. 
197. See id. at 774-75 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Of course, one has to question how 
much society benefits when aggressive law enforcement entails assaulting captive detainees. 
624 72 IOWA LAW REVIEW 577 [1987] 
The dialogue on economic reasoning between the majority and the 
dissent highlights the fact that economic reasoning is not determinative of 
value choices. 19B The majority chooses deterrence of misconduct as a 
primary goal, and utilizes economic reasoning to discover how to achieve 
that end, i,e., it is necessary to make the defendant pay the full costs of the 
harm produced. 199 The dissenter chooses instead to promote aggressive law 
enforcement and also utilizes economic reasoning to determine how to 
reach that goal, i.e., the threat of liability is sufficient deterrence and the 
internalization of costs to the party not reaping the benefits is too 
inhibiting.20o Thus, Dobson illustrates a situation in which there are two 
competing policies, each supported by a different economic argument.201 
198. See sllJ'Ta text accompanying note 123. 
199. See 705 F.2d at 770. 
200. See id. at 774-75 (Higginbotham, j., dissenting). 
201. Madison Consulting Group v. South Carolina, 752 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1985), 
represents the use of a single economic argument to show that the policy choice can go either 
way. The majority concluded that Wisconsin could assert personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident (orporation which had initiated a contract with plaintiff, the major portion of 
which was to be performed in Wisconsin. See id. at 1195. In a separate opinion concurring in 
the result, judge Swygert argued that a prior Seventh Circuit decision, which the majority 
upheld but distinguished away, should be overruled. See id. at 1208 (Swygert,j., concurring in 
the result). The prior decision held that a contractual obligation that causes a plaintiffs 
5ub!.tantial performance to occur in the forum state is not itself sufficient to give the forum 
state persona! jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. judge Swyg.;:rt wants to overrule 
that standard Addressing the usual concerns for fairness to the defendant in such cases, he 
ass('rts, "it is difficult to see how a sophisticated merchant who enters interstate commerce by 
contracting With an out-of-State merchant can be a victim of fundamental unfairness by virtue 
of the [out-of-State J court's decision to grant jurisdiction solely on the basis of that contract." 
See U. at 1209 (Swygert,]., concurring). Observing that the primary effect of such a rule would 
force the defmdant merchant to internalize the costs of possible litigation in a foreign state, 
judge Swygert also recognizes that this economic argument "cuts both ways." See id. at n.7 
(Swrgert,]., concurring). He observes that the opposite rule would foro~ the plaintiff instead 
to internalize those costs. In fact, he notes, it would be equally burdensome to force either the 
defendant or the plaintiff to internalize those costs. "[W]hile it is often stated that modern 
economic de~elopments make it easier ... to defend suits in foreign States, these same 
developments make it equally easy for the plaintiff to sue the defendant in defendant's home 
forum." [d. (citations omitted). judge Swygert concludes that it would be equally fair to place 
the burden on either party. "Absent any transaction costs, it would bejust ~ fair ... to force 
the plaintiff, not the defendant, to internalize such costs." [d. (citing Coase's article for 
support). 
judge Swy~;ert goes on to argue that the doctrine defining the constitutional reach of 
perwnaljurisdiction requires that the court fccus primarily on the fairness to thedeferulant. See 
id. at 1210 n.7. Bllt if. World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) 
("Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the 
def('ndant, ""pile always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light 
of other relevant factors ... "). Since it is not Ilnfair to place the burden on the defendant, judge 
Swygert concludes that doing so cannot be a violation of due process. See 752 F.2d at 1210 n.7. 
Thus,judg(' Swygert uses the economic argument relating to internalization of costs to assist 
him in determining how to apply a legal doctrine on fundamental fairness. The legal doctrine 
itself embodie:; a policy choice, one which focuses on fairness to the defendant rather than the 
plaintiff. The ~conomic analysis guides implementation of that policy choice even though the 
economic argument alone (without the policy choice) would support either conclusion. 
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C. Policy Choices in Efficiency Clothing: The False Conflict 
Sometimes economic efficiency seems to compete with other policy 
considerations. The courts may appear to reject economic efficiency as a 
policy choice. This appearance is deceiving. Economic analysis seeks to 
discern the different economically efficient states that potentially can be 
achieved. Once the policymaker selects a particular state, economic reason-
ing then can be used to determine how to reach that choice as efficiendy as 
possible.202 Economic efficiency is inextricably tied to economic analysis 
and therefore a rejection of economic efficiency is in reality a rejection of 
economic reasoning. However, since economic reasoning is merely an 
analytical methodology for discovering choices and how best to achieve 
them, it cannot be rejected as a moral choice. When the courts believe they 
are rejecting a policy of economic efficiency, they are, in fact, rejecting a 
particular social choice or value that either explicidy or implicidy underlies 
that policy. 
Excellent examples of this phenomenon include City of Flagstaff v. 
Atchinson, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway (Atchinson)203 and District of Columbia 
v. Air Florida.204 In both cases a municipality brought suit against a 
tortfeasor to recoup the expenses for rescue and cleanup operations 
following a catastrophic accident.205 Both courts rejected the municipalities' 
claims for damages on the ground that the legislature in each municipality 
had determined that the costs of these accidents were to be borne by the 
cities.206 The municipalities' claims in effect attack economic or fiscal 
legislation, and therefore the courts used low level rational basis scrutiny.207 
Because the legislative decision to make the city bear the costs is a rational 
one, each court concluded that even if it could be shown that the tortfeasor 
202. The analysis in Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 188-201, illustrates this principle well. 
203.719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983). 
204.750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
205. The Atchison case arose from the derailment of a train carrying liquid petroleum gas. 
The accident required the city to evacuate its residents as far as a mile away. See 719 F.2d at 
323. The Air Florida case resulted from the crash of a passenger jet into the Potomac River near 
the Washington D.C. area. See 750 F.2d at 1078. In Atchison, the damages amounted to nearly 
$42,000 and in Air Florida the damages exceeded $750,000. 
206. See Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1080 ("It is critically important to recognize that the 
government's decision to provide tax-supported services is a legislative policy determina-
tion."); Atchison, 719 F.2d at 324 ("If the government has chosen to bear the cost for reasons 
of economic efficiency, or even as a subsidy to the citizens and their business, the decision 
implicates fiscal policy; the legislature and its public deliberative processes, rather than the 
court, is the appropriate forum to address such fiscal concerns."). The Air Florida court 
explicitly adopted the reasoning and rule of Atchison, see 750 F.2d at 1080; hence further 
references will be made to the Atchison case only. 
207. When the Atchison court concludes that the city's allocation of the emergency cost is 
"neither irrational nor unfair," they seem to refer to the constitutional level of judicial scrutiny 
to be applied when the issue is an economic one. See 719 F.2d at 323. See generally 2 R. 
ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 18.3, at 330 (1986) (rational basis test used to review laws or regulations challenged under 
due process or equal protection guarantees unless "fundamental constitutional right, suspect 
classification or the characteristics of alienage, sex or legitimacy" involved). 
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and not the city was the "more efficient cost avoider," the burden could not 
be shifted to the tortfeasor.208 
On the surface each court appears to reject economic efficiency in 
favor of rationality scrutiny. Indeed, it appears that each court rejects 
economic efficiency because it conflicts with a principle oflaw. But a closer 
examination of these opinions reveals that a more subtle choice being 
made, one that involves a selection from competing values rather than 
different methods of analysis. 
The Atchinson court says that even if it possessed the necessary 
information to assign liability to the more efficient cost avoider, and if that 
assignment differed from the legislature's choice, the court would not shift 
the burden to that more efficient cost avoider.209 Implicit in the court's 
statement regarding "information to determine the most efficient cost-
avoider" lurks the notion of an objective measure that can assess the utility 
to society of burdening one party as opposed to the other. There are 
different effects, however, from placing the cleanup burden on one party 
or the other. For example, if the municipality pays for cleanup, it can 
spread the risk of cost by taxation of its citizens. On the other hand, if the 
common carrier bears the responsibility, the effect is to motivate accident 
deterrence and risk spreading through higher fees for customer services. 
There is no objective measure by which to compare these effects. Valuing 
one effect over the other is a value choice, one which is necessarily 
subjective. 
Presumably, the courts' discussion of the information that would 
determine the most efficient cost avoider contemplates using market prices 
to do so. Therefore, the court must believe that the market prices provide 
an objective valuation of the effects of choices. Using market prices as a 
means of making the comparison, however, is not objective. The choice of 
market prices is itself a value decision to use society's current expression in 
the mark,etplace.210 Thus, when a court refuses to change the burden 
because to do so differs from the legislature's choice, the court believes it is 
potentially rejecting the economically efficient choice, when in fact it is not. 
The court is actually rejecting the value choice implicit in the market's 
comparison of the two effects and does so in deference to the legislature's 
evaluation of the competing liability assignments. The legislature may have 
decided, for example, to place more value on the benefits of subsidization 
of business in the city in order to stimulate the city'S economic growth.211 In 
deferring to the legislature's evaluation the court implicitly complies with 
the operative rule of law requiring the judiciary to leave rational legislative 
decisions undisturbed.212 
208. See 719 F.2d at 323-24. 
209. See id. 
210. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. 
211. Cf. 719 F.2d at 324. 
212. Like the courts in Atchinson and Air Florida, the court in Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United 
States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), appears to reject economic efficiency in favor of a rule of 
law. In Bushey, a dry dock owner sued the government (as shipowner) for recovery of damages 
done to the Qry dock by a government employee. While the Coast Guard ship was in dry dock, 
employees slept on board. One evening, an employee returned to the ship inebriated and 
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opened the dry dock valves, causing the ship to list to the side and do substantial damage to 
the dry dock. See id. at 168. The court addresses whether liability should be assigned on the 
basis of who is the least expensive accident avoider or on the more traditional grounds of 
respondeat superior. See id. at 170-71. The court notes that the dry dock owner was probably 
the least expensive accident avoider, see id. at 170 n.7, but decides to assign liability to the 
government because its employee's behavior was reasonably foreseeable within the meaning of 
the doctrine of respondeat superior, see id. at 171-72. Thus, the court appears to reject 
economic efficiency in favor of an operative rule of law. Again, this is not true. The court 
merely chooses one policy value over another. In this case it favors the fairness values inherent 
in respondeat superior over the values served by reducing the risk of accidents. This is not so 
bald a choice since respondeat superior contains its own aspects of risk reduction. It creates an 
incentive for the employer to scrutinize prospective employees for propensities toward safe 
and responsible behavior. The Bushey court, however, questions the efficacy of such incentives. 
See id. at 170. 
Though this choice appears to contradict what economic efficiency would dictate (i.e., 
assigning liability to reduce accidents most efficiently), that is a misperception. Economic 
efficiency analysis does not select accident reduction over respondeat superior principles; 
economic efficiency analysis merely indicates which party to hold liable if society wants a policy 
of accident reduction. The absence of efficiency considerations with respect to the respondeat 
superior doctrine does not imply that economic efficiency analysis rejects the doctrine. 
Respondeat superior is a valid policy alternative to accident reduction. It does not lose validity 
simply because it does not call for economic reasoning. Thus, the court erroneously infers that 
its choice of respondeat superior rejects economic efficiency analysis. The choice does not 
reject economic efficiency, it rejects the policy of accident reduction. 
In Bushey, Air Florida, and Atchinson, the courts appear to reject economic efficiency when it 
is in competition with other policies or legal rules. In Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 105 
Idaho 320, 669 P.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 108 Idaho 602,701 P.2d 222 (1985), the court 
seems to do the opposite, that is, it appears to reject an alternative legal principle in favor of 
economic efficiency when the two are in direct conflict. Double R involved homeowners who 
brought suit for damages and injunctive relief against a feedlot alleging that the feedlot's 
expansion had created a nuisance. See 105 Idaho at 321-22, 669 P.2d at 644-45. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals questioned whether to adopt § 826 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
provides that injunctive relief can be granted. only if the gravity of the harm outweighs the 
utility of the actor's conduct. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1977). However, if 
the harm is serious but does not outweigh the utility, then the plaintiff is limited to receiving 
compensatory damages unless the award of such damages itself would cause the defendant 
business to fail. In that situation, the damages will be for less than full compensation. See id. 
§ 826(b). The court notes that the Restatement's guidelines arguably effect a form of private 
eminent domain in certain situtations. See 105 Idaho at 331,669 P.2d at 654. The Restatement's 
injunctive and damages remedies accommodate the objective of economic efficiency by 
allowing an enterprise to continue to operate if its value to society exceeds its harm. See id. at 
334, 669 P.2d at 656-57. But the Restatement also promotes distributive justice by allowing 
compensation to the individuals harmed by such activities. These goals, however, conflict 
when full compensation to harmed individuals would terminate a business whose productivity 
value exceeds the value of the harm. In that case, the Restatement permits the firm to stay in 
business without having to pay full compensation. See id., 669 P.2d at 657. In spite of this 
distributional inequity, the court adopts the Restatement view. It thus appears that the court 
chooses economic efficiency over distributional justice. In reality, the court implicitly decides 
to adopt the value choices underlying the Restatement's provisions on injunctive and damage 
remedies. The value choice implicit in the Restatement is the notion that when an enterprise's 
utility to society (the assessment of which, in itself, is a value choice made by decisionmakers) 
exceeds the harm (again, the measure of which is determined by a value choice), there will be 
a redistribution in the form of denying injunctive or full damage relief. 
Some might view this decision as a choice of economic efficiency because it appears to be the 
result of a straightforward cost benefit analysis, but it is not. The court has to evaluate the 
effects of its decision on each of the disputing parties. In determining the weight to be given 
these effects, the court must make a comparative evaluation which of necessity incorporates 
subjective factors. On the surface, the court, by adopting the Restatement view, apparently 
adopts a policy similar to Coase and Posner. The decision not to award full compensation 
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.D. The Fallacy and Pitfalls of "Economic Determinism" 
The final two cases illustrate the importance of clearly articulating the 
distinction between social policies and economic efficiency analysis. Be-
cause economic efficiency cannot operate without a value choice, every 
economic efficiency argument implicitly or explicitly embodies a value 
choice dt:termined by the individual making the argument.213 The failure 
to make the choice explicit merely means that a disguised value choice is 
made in the name of economic efficiency, one that may not be consistent 
with current societal goals. Calling the value decision "economic efficiency" 
creates false or misleading choices that might not be made if the policy 
decision proffered were explicit. In other words, it thwarts meaningful 
comparison between competing policies. A decisionmaker might give up an 
important societal goal, believing that economic efficiency requires it; that 
decision maker might not do so if the true value choice underlying the 
economic efficiency argument were understood. On the other hand, a 
decisionmaker seeking to disguise a value choice that might othen"ise be 
unpalatable may accomplish that goal simply by couching it as a purely 
economic efficiency argument. Both decisionmakers commit the fallacy of 
economic determinism; that is, they proceed as if economic arguments were 
a neutral policy value. 
Jud~;e Posner's writings exemplify this confusion between economic 
efficiency analysis and policy choices. Both in United States Fidelity c..<? 
Guaranty Co. v. Plovidba,214 which he appears to decide on purely economic 
efficiency grounds, and in his commentary215 on the opinion in Union Oil v. 
Oppen,216 which he criticizes for bad economic reasoning, Judge Posner 
when a productive finn may be put out of business certainly seems analogous to Coase':; 
railroad scenario, which pennits the railroad to cast sparks onto adjacent landowners' property 
without paying compensation for the damage. See supra note 51 and text accompanying notes 
40-51. However, the Double R court's approach differs because the decisionmaker is not 
CClnfined to the use of market prices to assess relative hanns and benefits. The court notes that 
factor~ such as "personal health and safety" as well as "fundamental freedom of action within 
the boundaJies of ... [one's] own property" play an integral role in measuring the gravity of 
the harm for purposes of the § 826 balancing test and that these factors ordinarily would favor 
the granting; of injunctive relief. See 105 Idaho at 331-32, 669 P.2d at 654. The court further 
sUI~gests that for those few cases in which injunctive relief under the Restatement would not 
lit-notwithstanding the invasion of health, safety, and fundamental freedom-injunctive 
relief ~till might be available. The court states that its adoption of the Restatement's test for 
nuisance "stops short of being absolute." See id. at 332, 669 P.2d at 654-55. This tilt toward 
concern for distributive justice reflects Coase's caveat that broader sodal dimensions should 
enter the solution of economic problems. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. However, 
the Double R court looks beyond Coase's generalities and articulates specifi: factors relevant to 
achieving those goals and how they will affect the outcomes of such disputes. 
The Idaho Supreme Court rejects the lower court's application of the Restatement, substi-
tuting a CO;lsian-styled argument which immunizes a nuisance source from liability if the 
utility of thl~ source's conduct is in "the interests of the community." See 108 Idaho 602, 
607-08, 701 P.2d 222, 227-28. One dissenting justice particularly emphasizes the need to 
spread the C)sts of nuisance by internalizing them in the price of the source's product. See id. 
at 610,701 P.2d at 230 (Bistline,J., dissenting). 
213. See slIpra note 122 and accompanying text. 
214.683 r.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982). 
215. Posn('r, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 297-301 (1979). 
216.501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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reveals that he himself is subject to making value choices, albeit subtle ones, 
in the name of economic efficiency. 
In Plovidba a longshoreman fell to his death aboard ship after he 
entered a darkened hold in which a hatch was open.217 Although his crew 
was working in the adjacent hold, the longshoreman had no authority to be 
in the darkened one.218 The complaint alleged that the shipowner negli-
gently failed to erect barriers or post warnings of danger across the open 
entryway separating the two holds.219 
Judge Posner applied the Learned Hand negligence formula220 to 
decide Plovidba. This formula weighs the cost (labeled B) to the defendant 
of taking measures to avoid the accident against the "expected harm." The 
"expected harm" is defined as the actual harm that might occur (L) 
multiplied by the probability (P) that it will occur, given the failure to take 
precautionary measures.221 If the cost of the precautionary measures is less 
than the expected harm, then the failure to take those measures constitutes 
negligence.222 Algebraically, this is written as: failure to take precautionary 
measures is negligence when B < P * L (where "<" means "less than" and 
"*,, means "multiplied by"). 
In Plovidba, L is high (L equals the loss of life) and B is low (the cost to 
the shipowner of posting warning signs or barriers in entryways to 
darkened holds). Judge Posner must find P (the probability of future harm) 
very small if he wishes to avoid assigning liability to the shipowner.223 In his 
probability analysis, Posner makes three behavioral assumptions. First, the 
decedent returned to the darkened hold to steal. Second, this behavior in 
longshoremen is aberrant.224 Third, Posner assumes (without stating) that 
longshoremen and shipowners are in equal bargaining positions. This 
assumption is essential for his market analysis that concludes that the 
shipowner's decision not to undertake any precautions was proof in itself 
that the decision was not negligent.225 Although some evidence supported 
217. Each hold has several vertical levels, each of which is separated from the level above by 
a hatch. When the hatch is closed it becomes the floor the longshoremen walk upon while 
loading cargo onto that level. When the hatch is open, the level below is accessible for loading. 
In Plovidba, when the hold was completely loaded, the shipowner left the hold dark and all but 
the top hatch open. The decedent entered the hold and fell to his death through the open 
hatches. See 683 F.2d at 1023. 
218. See id. at 1028. 
219. See id. at 1024. 
220. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), in which Judge 
Learned Hand first articulated his famous economic balancing test. 
221. Since the probability of an accident occurring is always less than 1, the value of the 
"expected harm," that is, the value of the harm multiplied by its probability, is always less than 
the value of the harm if it actually occurred. The degree to which the expected harm is less 
than the actual harm depends on the probability of the accident occurring. The smaller the 
probability is (or is perceived to be), the smaller the calculation of the expected harm is relative 
to the actual harm when it is applied in the Learned Hand formula. 
222. See 159 F.2d at 173. 
223. See 683 F.2d at 1027-28. 
224. See id. at 1028. 
225. Judge Posner argues that when the shipowner makes a decision whether to undertake 
the burdens of avoiding a specific risk of harm to longshoremen, the shipowner is faced with 
two choices. He must either take action to avoid the risk of harm or, in response to market 
forces, compensate the longshoremen for the increased risk of expected harm that results 
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the assumption that the longshoreman was stealing,226 little evidence 
supported the belief that the probability of theft was so small as to be 
negligible.227 No evidence supported the validity of Posner's implicit 
assumption of equal bargaining power between the longshoremen and the 
shipowner.228 
Presumably, Judge Posner chose the Learned Hand formula to 
achieve tl:.e appearance of ne~tral economic reasoning. The formula is a 
paradigm of cost-benefit analysis, a type of economic reasoning frequently 
applied to policy questions.229 In Judge Posner's discussion of efforts by 
other courts to grapple with negligence standards, he implies that their 
analyses are mired in confusion.230 Judge Posner offers the Learned Hand 
formula as "a valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors that are 
relevant to a judgment of negligence and about the relationship among 
those factors."231 
In fa,:t, the cost-benefit approach in general and the Learned Hand 
formula in particular are not the dispassionate inquiry into the "relevant 
factors" that Judge Posner suggests. In applying the formula he had to 
make a number of assumptions that are in fact value choices.232 In addition, 
the choice of the formula implies a value choice since the Learned Hand 
formula is only one available means for assessing negligence in order to 
determine accident liability. The courts use a variety of approaches to 
determine third party negligence: the foreseeable harm analysis,233 a policy 
of accident minimization,234 and assignment of liability to the least-cost 
accident avoider.235 
The least-cost accident avoider approach seeks to avoid accidents at 
from not doing so. If the costs of avoiding the hann are greater than the cost of the increased 
compensation, the shipowner will prefer to pay the increased wages. If the costs of avoiding 
the harm are less, then the shipowner will choose instead to undertake the precautionary 
measures. Judge Posner argues that since the shipowner in Plovidba chose not to undertake the 
precautions, the costs of doing so must have exceeded the cost of the increased wages and 
therefore the expected hann. Since the cost of the precautionary measures (B) exceeded the 
e:_pected harm (P~'L), Judge Posner concludes that under the Learned Hand fonnula the 
shipowner is not to be found negligent. See id. at 1029. But see infra note 228 and accompanying 
text (describing problems underlying Posner's analysis). 
226. See id. at 1028. 
227.Judge Posner asserts that the probability that a longshoreman would steal is so 
infinite~imalll small that it need not be taken into consideration by the shipowner. However, 
the Author's casual survey of colleagues returning from Europe whose shipped automobiles 
invariably anive with their radios missing suggests that Judge Posner's assessment of the 
probability of the occurrence of certain characteristics is unrealistic. Cf Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 
Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Gir. 1968) (discussing employer's need to consider 
characteristic; of seamen and risks of injury inherent in working environment). 
228. Judge Posner's argument presupposes that the longshoreman and the shipowner hold 
roughly equal bargaining positions; that is, it presupposes that the longshoreman can 
effectively ne.Jotiate for higher wages to compensate for the increased hann. This is a highly 
suspect assumption for which Judge Posner provides no evidentiary support. 
229. See ger.·eraily G. GoETZ, GASE.S AND MATERIALS ON LAw AND ECONOMICS 292-374 (1983). 
230. See 68:3 F.2d at 1025. 
231. See id. at 1026. 
232. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying te.xt. 
233. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Gir. 1968). 
234. See Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 475, 478 (9th Gir.' 1980). 
235. See Bu.;hey, 398 F.2d at 170-71. 
ECONOMICS FOR THE COMMON MAN 631 
the least cost to society by combining a policy of accident minimization with 
cost-benefit analysis.236 It assigns liability to the party who can more 
cheaply avoid the accident. The approach represents an effort to sustain 
incentives to keep accidents down.237 If Judge Posner had chosen the 
economic approach ofleast-cost accident avoidance, the choice likely would 
have altered the outcome of Plovidba. Since the shipowner's cost of erecting 
barriers to prevent entry (such as locked doors) is trivial compared with the 
cost to the stevedore of providing equal assurance (for example, through 
increased security staff) that no longshoremen will wander into unseen 
dangers, the shipowner would be found liable.238 Thus Judge Posner's 
economic approach to negligence is not unique; other equally economically 
efficient approaches to determining negligence exist. The approaches 
differ not in the degree of economic efficiency but, as demonstrated in the 
Plovidba case, in the identity of the party who bears the costs of the risk of 
harm (the shipowner or the longshoreman). 
Clearly, Judge Posner's use of the Learned Hand formula does not 
lead to an economically determinative judgment. To the contrary, it can be 
seen once more how efficiency analysis can support opposite conclusions; 
the value choice made initially determines what conclusion will be reached. 
In determining the test for negligence, any legal standard incorporating 
economic efficiency also must embody the value choice of who is to bear the 
risk ofharm.239 The value choices implicit in the economic argument must 
be unmasked if the courts are to make informed choices. 
Posner's criticism240 of Union Oil Co. v. Oppen241 forcefully drives home 
the dangers stemming from the fallacy of economic determinism, and the 
importance of distinguishing between value choices and economic reason-
ing. Posner frames his criticism as an objective evaluation of the powers of 
236. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 159, at 35-129. 
237. See Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 677, 
688-93 (1985); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,2-3,7-8 (1980). 
238. This is not to say that the least-cost accident avoider approach would lead to a different 
efficient outcome. Both under the least-cost accident avoider doctrine and the Learned Hand 
formula, the shipowner would still face the same economic decision, to wit, whether to 
undertake the burden of avoiding the accident or to pay for the expected harm (either through 
higher wages or through liability in the event of an accident). If the cost of the burden e.xceeds 
the expected harm, the shipowner will choose not to undertake the burden under either 
policy. If the Learned Hand formula applies, the shipowner will choose not to undertake the 
burden because he will be found not negligent and therefore not liable. Under the least-cost 
accident avoider theory, the shipowner will still not undertake the burden because even though 
he is still liable for the harm, the expected costs for such liability is less than the costs of the 
burden. Thus, under either policy, the shipowner will make the same economic efficiency 
decision with respect to avoiding the harm. The only difference between the two policies is 
whether, if the accident occurs, the shipowner pays for the harm. 
239. For example, the value embodied in the Learned Hand formula (as applied in Plovidba) 
incorporates the decision to hold the shipowner free of liability if an economically efficient 
choice is made concerning the level of risk to which the shipowner exposes the plaintiff. See 
Plovidba, 683 F.2d at 1026. On the other hand, the least-cost accident avoider approach, which 
seeks to maintain incentives to further reduce the risk of accidents, assigns liability to the 
shipowner even if it chooses to expose plaintiff to an economically efficient level of risk. See 
supra note 238. 
240. Posner, supra note 215, at 297-301. 
241. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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economic reasoning of the opinion's author, Judge Sneed. In fact, close 
examination uncovers the value conflict that forms the core of the disagree-
ment between Posner's and Sneed's approaches. 
In Union Oil a spill by the oil company destroyed much aquatic life off 
the Sant2l Barbara coast and thereby seriously reduced the expected future 
income of commercial fishermen. Plaintiffs sought recovery for the loss of 
a prospective economic advantage.242 The defendants argued that this 
form of recovery would subject them to unforeseeable claims based on 
remote and speculative injuries.243 The court imposed liability based on 
principles of admiralty law244 (fishermen are special seamen and have the 
right to r,~cover future economic losses) and on the ground of foreseeability 
of the risk of pollution to the environment.245 
Although the court rests its decision on legal principles, Judge Sneed 
turns to economic analysis to buttress the panel's decision. He cites both 
Calabresi and Coase to support his argument that tort liability should be 
assigned so as to achieve, as closely as possible, the optimal allocation of 
resource~. Judge Sneed characterizes this optimum as the one achieved by 
"a perfect market system." That economic approach "requires the court to 
fix the identity of the party who can avoid the costs most cheaply. Once 
fixed, this determination then controls liability."246 
JudUe Sneed apparendy believes that a single economically efficient 
allocation of resources exists, and that the least-cost accident avoider 
approach brings society closest to that allocation. His opinion serves to 
indicate how strong the impression is among jurists that only one optimal 
allocation of resources exists and that it is economically determinative. But, 
as previously discussed, more than one economically efficient choice exists, 
each embodying different value choices.247 Judge Sneed's choice of the 
least-cost accident avoider approach emphasizes the value of minimizing 
the prob~.bility of accidents. An alternative choice might have been a policy 
that encourages oil exploration and development. In that case, an econom-
ically efficient policy permits plaintiffs to recover only if they could 
demonstrate that defendant did not take prudent care, an analysis remi-
niscent c.f the Learned Hand approach248 or the Coase-Posner total 
product rule.249 This is not to suggest that Judge Sneed's approach is more 
or less Freferable. Rather, the observation serves as a reminder that 
different value choices exist, that Judge Sneed made one, and in fact had to 
make one before he could apply economic efficiency analysis to implement 
it. 
Recognition that different policies often call for different economic 
reasoning; and remedies provides for a better understanding of Judge (then 
242. See id. at 563. 
243. See id.; see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 1008 (discussing general 
principle thlt denies damages for loss of prospective economic advantage). 
244. See 501 F.2d at 567. 
245. See UI. at 568-69. 
246. See UI. at 569. 
247. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
248. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 37-57. 
ECONOMICS FOR THE COMMON MAN 633 
Professor) Posner's somewhat acerbic commentary on Union Oil in a law 
review article.250 While Posner's analysis of Judge Sneed's opinion is 
couched as criticism of Judge Sneed's economic reasoning powers,251 what 
Posner really disagrees with are Judge Sneed's value choices.252 For 
example, Judge Sneed does not want to assign liability to "such groups as 
consumers of staple groceries" who are not involved with eitller oil or fish 
production.253 Posner finds the concern confusing and the justification 
obscure. Posner notes that "there is no tort mechanism by which the 
manufacturers, sellers, or consumers of staple groceries could be made to 
bear the costs of the Santa Barbara oil spill."254 Posner confesses that he 
does not understand how imposing liability on defendants will still impose 
some costs on these groupS.255 
Judge Sneed obviously recognizes that the Union Oil situation really 
involves three groups: the plaintiffs, the defendants, and the rest of society 
that may draw pleasure from the Santa Barbara coast. The court wishes to 
avoid "assigning liability" to the third group, because the members of that 
group cannot assist in avoiding the accident but nonetheless will bear some 
of the accident's costs.256 Posner fails to see that not assigning liability to one 
party effectively assigns liability to the others. If the defendants escape full 
liability, then by default the rest of society bears the costs of the accident. 
This holds true whether plaintiffs and the rest of society explicitly bear the 
costs by paying higher taxes to repair the damage,257 or whether they bear 
the costs implicitly through the loss of the use of the Santa Barbara Channel 
and beaches. Judge Sneed correctly perceives that the outcome of Union Oil 
does not prevent the rest of society from bearing part of the loss, because 
the action involves only the compensation of fishermen for forgone 
profits.258 Whatever pleasure third parties have lost, such as pleasant 
beaches and clean swimming areas, goes uncompensated. Thus, Judge 
Sneed expresses the court's value choice: the minimization of costs that·the 
rest of society will have to bear. 
Posner also objects, on the grounds of unsound economic reason-
ing,259 to the court's justification that "the loss should be allocated to that 
party who can best correct any error in allocation . . . by acquiring the 
activity to which the party has been made liable."260 His objection is 
particularly interesting because the court's statement represents reasoning 
which is in fact quite sound but that advocates a policy prescription in direct 
250. See Posner, supra note 215, at 297-301. 
251. See id. at 297. 
252. Notably,Judge Posner states that he concurs with Judge Sneed's result even though not 
with Judge Sneed's analysis. See id. at 300. As will become apparent, Posner's statement does 
not diminish my critique here. 
253. See Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 569-70. 
254. See Posner, supra note 215, at 299. 
255. See id. at 299-300. 
256. See 501 F.2d at 570. 
257. Not unlike the choice to have municipal taxpayers bear the cost for rescue and clean-up 
of catastrophic accidents. See supra text accompanying notes 206-12. 
258. See 501 F.2d at 570. 
259. See Posner, supra note 215, at 300. 
260. See 501 F.2d. at 570. 
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opposition to Posner's own (i.e., his version of the total product rule).261 
Recall the discussion of Coase's railroad allegory which addressed the 
economic efficiency issues of the railroad buying the farmer's land. The 
economically efficient outcome dictates that the harming party compensate 
the harmt'd party for the losses incurred. Efficiency, however, also requires 
that lossell be minimized. In the railroad example, minimizing the losses 
means that the farmers do not employ society's resources to produce crops 
that would be destroyed anyway. Optimally the farmers should not plant 
crops and the railroad should have to compensate the farmers only for their 
forgone profits. The present value of the forgone profits over time 
determint·s the value of the land. Thus, purchasing the land from the 
farmer is the economic equivalent of the railroad compensating the farmer 
for forgone profits in every time period.262 
Clearly, purchasing the land falls into the category of "buying out" the 
other party. At least in a commercial context, the party who earns the 
greatest profit from a resource is the one who will find it more useful. Being 
the more profitable user, the party also is more capable of buying the right. 
The question is whether this justifies assigning the liability (and not the 
right) to the party more capable of buying it anyway. Once the problem is 
distilled in this fashion, it is easy to recognize that Posner already expressed 
his opinion on this issue. He believes that the right (and not the liability) 
should be assigned to the party who would have purchased the right 
anyway.263 His justification is that this ensures that the party who will use 
the right more efficiently will have it.264 Relying on Calabresi,265 Judge 
Sneed chooses an opposite rule, that is, to assign the liability (and not the 
right) to the party who would have purchased the right.266 This choice is 
equally valid from an economic standpoint because (in the presence of 
transactions costs) that party is just as likely to ultimately use the right as 
efficiently (through purchase) as it will when assigned the right.267 The 
choice between the two is one of wealth distribution and equity, not 
economic efficiency.268 The ultimate question in this case is who will own 
and control the value of the environment, not how to use it efficiently. 
Posner's policy prescription would dictate that the oil companies own and 
control the environment. Judge Sneed's court clearly supports different 
distributional values: "[T]he public's deep disapproval of injuries to the 
environment and the strong policy of preventing such injuries, all point to 
the existence of a required duty."269 Though Posner may have problems 
understanding the economic reasoning of the Union Oil court, his critique 
stems ultimately from his basic disagreement with economic reasoning 
processes that proceed from value premises that are different from his own. 
261. See st;pra text accompanying notes 52-58. 
262. See st;pra text accompanying notes 78-8l. 
263. R. PC'SNER, supra note 10, at 45. 
264. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The merits of this position have been 
dir.cussed in the previous section. See supra text accompanying notes 58-102. 
265. G. Cr.LABRESI, supra note 159, at 69-73. 
266. See 501 F.2d at 570. 
267. See st;pra notes 61, 83 and accompanying text. 
268. See 501 F.2d at 569. 
269. See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article contains an examination of the role that economic analysis 
can play in assisting the judicial process. Economic analysis is a reasoning 
tool that can assist in, but is separate from, the process of making value 
choices. Not only can economic reasoning reveal policy choices, both of an 
economic and noneconomic dimension, but it also can help advance 
selected policy goals more effectively. Thus, economic analysis does not, 
and indeed cannot, dictate policy choices. 
As a springboard to demonstrate the truth of these assertions, this 
Article scrutinizes a policy recommendation that has gained widespread 
attention both in the scholarly and judicial arenas. This approach, referred 
to here as the Coase-Posner total product rule, claims to select resolutions 
to disputes that are economically dictated. This Article analyzes the 
Coase-Posner total product rule in two contexts. On one level, a careful 
economic analysis shows that the policy does not in fact promote economic 
efficiency as its proponents maintain. In addition, a functional analysis of 
the total product rule indicates that the rule masks a value system rather 
than providing the unbiased approach to dispute resolution that its authors 
claim. A legal-economic analysis of cases citing Coase demonstrates that 
most courts intuitively use economic reasoning properly: to discern and 
effectuate policy choices. This exposition affirms for the legal community 
that economic analysis can be a useful tool-one that need not be steeped 
in any particular value system that the potential user does not share. 
